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ABSTRACT
The ability to remember has been described as one of the most important cognitive
functions, largely because it is evolutionarily optimal to be able to retain information
relevant to survival. Autobiographical memory, which is defined as one’s memory for
their own experiences, is especially paramount as it contributes to self-identity and the
ability to learn from past experiences. The current study investigated the brain activation
associated with different types of social feedback on autobiographical memory through
the use of Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS). Seventeen undergraduate
participants were presented with video- and audio-recorded scenes of an actress
performing everyday tasks. One week later, they were given either confirmatory or
disconfirmatory social feedback regarding the accuracy and occurrence of their memories
whilst their left prefrontal cortical brain activity was recorded using fNIRS. It was found
that on average, participants’ brain activity differed dependent upon whether the feedback
was about scene details or scene occurrence, and upon whether the feedback was
confirmatory or disconfirmatory. It was also found that participants who maintained,
relinquished, or partially relinquished their belief in their memory had distinct patterns of
cortical activity. This study was the first to use a functional neuroimaging paradigm to
investigate the dissociation between one’s appraisals of belief in accuracy and
occurrence, demonstrating that they are neurologically distinct metamemorial appraisals.
Thus, these findings reinforce the uniqueness of decision-making about memory in
general, highlighting the continued need for research investigating the appraisals
contributing to memory reports.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Linking the Past to the Future through Memory
Remembering is described by Bartlett (1932) as a reconstruction of our own
imagination, stemming from the relationship between our attitudes and our organized past
experiences. The ability to remember allows us to essentially “re-experience” events that
may or may not be pertinent to our life stories. For example, most people can look fondly
upon the memory of their high school graduation, or their first time riding a bike.
However, there are instances in which remembering can be disrupted, disjointed, or
otherwise departed. In the classic case of Henry Molaison (famously known as HM), the
removal of the hippocampi within his medial temporal lobes resulted in a devastating
condition known as anterograde amnesia, which is the inability to form new memories
(Scoville & Milner, 1957). Any type of memory loss can be especially calamitous
because evolutionarily, our memory systems have been optimized to process and retain
fitness-relevant information, which allows us the ability to make decisions that can
benefit us in the future (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2016). For these reasons, memories are
much like “time capsules”, used to recount the past and to teach lessons for the future
(Rubin, 1988). In other words, by remembering the things that have happened to us, we
subsequently shape our future thoughts, goals, and actions.
The Basic Systems Model of Memory (Rubin, 2006) suggests that the mind and
brain are separated into several basic systems, and that separate systems for each of the
senses, spatial imagery, language, emotion, narrative, and motor output exist. Rubin
(2006) postulates that these systems all have their own forms of memory, and that
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multiple different metamemory processes are used to assemble one’s experience of
remembering. In this model, two specific appraisals are discussed and have been
established as being important for remembering what has happened in the past: belief,
which refers to the degree to which one’s perception of an event corresponds to the way
that it was truly experienced, and recollection, which is described as the presence of a
vivid mental representation, including a sense of re-experiencing of an event.
Recollection and belief are considered to be important metacognitive judgements based
on their high level of processing in each of the basic systems (spatial imagery, language,
emotion, narrative, and motor output).
Autobiographical Remembering
One important form of memory is autobiographical memory, which refers to the
memories that a person has of their own life experiences (Rubin, 1988). This type of
memory plays a fundamental role in the development and maintenance of one’s self
concept because it helps define who we are, and it ties us to our own personal histories
(Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001). The language used to describe this form of memory has
been widely disputed and it has past been referred to with terms such as “suddenly
remembering” (Munsat, 1967), and “personal memory” (Locke, 1971). The meaning of
the term “autobiographical memory” has been quite controversial, with some referring to
it as a form of episodic memory (Kopelman & Kapur, 2001; Rubin, 1998) and others
placing more emphasis on the importance of retaining knowledge about oneself to pursue
and achieve personal goals (Conway & Pleydell-Pierce, 2000).
Brewer (1986; 1995) prefers to use the term recollective memories, which he
describes as memories that occur when an individual recalls any specific episode from
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their own past. Brewer (1986) organizes recollective memories into four autobiographical
groups based on their acquisition conditions (single instance or repeated instance) and
their form of representation (imaginal or non-imaginal). First, a personal memory, is a
phenomenally experienced (i.e., perceptible by use of the senses or through immediate
experience) product of a single episode (e.g., I went rollerblading at Lakewood park on
Tuesday). Second, an autobiographical fact, is a non-phenomenally experienced product
of a single episode (e.g., I can recall that I went rollerblading on Tuesday). Third, a
generic personal memory, is a phenomenally experienced product of multiple episodes
(e.g., I have an image of myself rollerblading in an [unspecified] park in an [unspecified]
area of town). Finally, one forms their self-schema using the non-phenomenally
experienced product of multiple episodes (e.g. I am someone who likes to rollerblade).
Autobiographical memory includes a rich database of knowledge about oneself,
which makes it difficult to pinpoint a precise definition for it (Holland & Kensinger,
2010). This is largely because of Tulving (1972; 1983) who suggests that
autobiographical memory is divided into both episodic and semantic memory systems,
encompassing personal semantic information (e.g., facts about oneself, such as knowing
the date of your birthday), and personal episodic information (e.g., unique events, such as
remembering your high school graduation). Interestingly, recalling personal semantic
information does not depend on retrieving specific experiences, but rather is linked to
feelings of familiarity. Personal episodic memory is recalled quite differently, requiring a
sense of re-experiencing and the recollection of particular past events (Wheeler, Stuss, &
Tulving, 1997).
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Greenberg and Rubin (2003) also provide a comprehensive definition of
autobiographical memory, postulating that the term refers to memories that have several
properties: first, they state that autobiographical memory and episodic memory are
similar because they both receive and store information that is temporally dated, and is
about specific events that have a temporal-spatial relation among them (Tulving, 1983).
Second, they highlight that autobiographical memories involve more than just the
retrieval of stored data. As described by Tulving (1985), the rememberer must be
conscious of their prior conscious experience, a phenomenon known as autonoetic
consciousness. This autonoetic consciousness is a necessary but insufficient quality that
contributes to a memory being categorized as an autobiographical memory. The accounts
of philosophers (Brewer, 1995) and of amnesiacs (Crovitz, 1986) suggest that
autobiographical memories should be accompanied by a belief that the event occurred, as
well as experiences of reliving the event (Greenberg & Rubin, 2003). Therefore,
according to Greenberg and Rubin (2003), a memory of a personally experienced event
that stems from a sense of recollection or reliving is termed an autobiographical memory.
Memories can be Altered
There is a large body of research that suggests that memories are dynamic
reconstructions of the past, making them susceptible to change (Neisser, 1996; Wright &
Loftus, 1998). Because of this, the ability to remember things that have happened can be
both a blessing and a curse. Memory allows us to remember the things that are most
important, but it cannot always be trusted. The misinformation effect refers to an
impairment in one’s memory for the past that occurs when they have been exposed to
misleading information (Loftus, 1975). A 30-year investigation of the malleability of
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memory has addressed many of the questions surrounding this phenomenon (Loftus,
2005). First, we know that people are particularly prone to having their memories
affected by misinformation if it is introduced after the passage of time (Loftus, Miller, &
Burns, 1978). This is because it is possible that the memory has faded, and therefore it is
less likely that a discrepancy will be noticed. Second, it has been demonstrated that the
misinformation effect influences the memory of some people more than others.
Individual factors such as age (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Karpel, Hoyer, & Toglia, 2001;
Davis & Loftus, 2005), and certain personality characteristics such as empathy (Wright &
Livingston-Raper, 2002) play a prominent role in whether a person will fall prey to the
misinformation effect.
The misinformation effect postulates that new information can be added to
existing memories due to post-event influences. Loftus and Palmer (1974) presented their
participants with videos of automobile accidents and they instructed them to answer
questions such as “about how fast were the cars going when they smashed into each
other?”. This particular question suggests that the cars must have been going quite fast,
and when participants were administered a memory test one week later, the participants
who were given the verb smashed (others were given words such as bumped or collided)
were more likely to answer “yes” to the question “did you see any broken glass?” when
there was in fact, no broken glass. In this experiment, the introduction of the word
"smashed" provided the participants with new information that was then incorporated
into the original memory for the scene. When this happens, the participant now has a
memory for an event that was much more severe than the original accident,
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demonstrating that new and/or false information can be introduced into a person’s
memory.
In another classic study, Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978) found that information
obtained after an event can do more than just supplement or add to your memory; it can
alter it completely. Participants were again shown a series of slides depicting an
automobile accident, this time involving a pedestrian. Immediately after viewing the
slides, participants answered a series of questions. Half were asked “did another car pass
the red Datsun while it was stopped at the stop sign?”, and the other half were asked the
same question about a yield sign. All participants then completed a memory test in which
fifteen pairs of slides were presented and were asked to choose the slide that they had
seen earlier. The most critical pair of slides showed the red Datsun coming to a stop at a
stop sign, and an identical slide depicting the Datsun at a yield sign. The results of this
study demonstrated that the misleading information (the intervening question described
above) produced less accurate responding (e.g., participants were more likely to choose
the option that the leading question had contained). These findings demonstrate that the
information that a witness is exposed to after an event, whether it is consistent or
misleading, can transform that witness’ memory of the event.
Interestingly, Zaragoza and Lane (1994) took a different approach in their
exploration of the misinformation effect. In their study, they were interested in
determining whether people confuse their misleading suggestions for “real” memories of
a witnessed event, or if they just accept what others have told them as being true without
any personal recollection; a phenomenon known as the source misattribution effect. The
results of this study ultimately provided strong evidence that subjects really do believe
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that they remembered seeing suggested items (that were never actually presented to
them). Following the work of Zaragoza and Lane, Hyman (1999) clarified the three
cognitive processes required for the creation of these false memories: (1) acceptance of
the suggested information/event as plausible, (2) the creation of related imagery or
narrative, and (3) error(s) in source-monitoring. To elaborate, first, an event must be
plausible for it to be accepted as a possible memory. Next, one must have formed an
image or narrative of the event. And finally, a source monitoring error, where the
individual fails to recognize the source of the memory, must be made. This means that a
person may believe an event to be plausible but may not think the event is an actual
memory. Hyman (1999) highlights that having clear images and a greater level of affect
and self-involvement helps to increase the chance that a suggested or discounted memory
will be deemed as legitimate.
In everyday life, this phenomenon can occur when individuals who experience an
event together later discuss what happened to them. Wagenaar and Crombag (2005)
introduced the term collaborative storytelling, which represents the mutual reinforcement
of ideas, that can occur when people attempt to collaboratively judge uncertain
information. They presented a legal case where they proposed that when eyewitnesses
were asked about their memory for an event that could not be verified by direct
observation, they would tend to base their uncertainty upon the judgements of others. The
authors relate this finding to the aforementioned study by Loftus, Miller, and Burns
(1978) whereby information that a witness is exposed to after an event gets incorporated
into their memory for that event. According to Loftus and Hoffman (1989), this
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misinformation acceptance leads to a high degree of conviction about the new memories,
making it more believable.
This phenomenon has also been studied in university students. Hyman, Husband,
and Billings (1995) were interested in determining whether university students create
false memories of childhood experiences in response to misleading questions and the
demands of an interview. In their first experiment, they provided their subjects with
descriptions of events that had allegedly occurred during the students’ childhood. They
found that 20% of the students agreed that these events occurred, later freely recalling the
event with the misinformation included in their rendition of the memory. A second
experiment used less likely events such as spilling punch on the parents of the bride at a
childhood wedding. This protocol also employed an extra interview, and increased
conformity demands. The results indicated that 25% of the students produced a false
recall. Taken together, this study illustrates that some individuals create false memories,
and those who discuss related background knowledge during the early interviews are
more likely to create a false recollection. The authors suggest that incorporation of
information about remembered events in response to the social context may be a general
phenomenon. In other words, when people engage in memory discussions with others,
those around them may present differing views, memories, and reactions; calling into
question their own memory for the event.
Although memory can be transformed due to post-event influences, there are
instances in which people resist feedback from others. In one study, researchers examined
“disputed memories”, which differ from the memory errors previously described in that
the major detail in dispute relates to who is protagonist of the event (Sheen, Kemp, &
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Rubin, 2001). This was investigated in twins who disagreed about who ‘owns’ a certain
autobiographical memory. For example, one disputed memory was described as “I (not
my sister) ran into a clothesline and cut my head”. It was determined that disputed
memories are a stable and reliable memory error, and that they occur frequently among
twins who spend a great deal of time together. Moreover, the twins in this study were unwilling to give up their autobiographical memories and considered them to be true
accounts of past experiences even when they were presented with contrary evidence from
the other twin. In this case, the dissonance (i.e., mental discomfort) that results from
receiving discordant information from a trusted individual is relieved because of the unwillingness to relinquish the memory.
Cognitive Dissonance
Festinger (1957) proposed that humans strive for internal psychological
consistency because it allows us to function well mentally. When people receive
information that is inconsistent or discordant from what they believe to be true, cognitive
discomfort, or dissonance, is experienced. Dissonance may arise from within a social
group when an individual’s memory for an event is challenged by another person.
Festinger (1957) examined how holding thoughts that are inconsistent with one another
creates a “mental discomfort” that causes us to act in order to relieve this discomfort. He
suggests that we may resolve this discomfort caused by holding inconsistencies in one of
three ways: (a) by changing one of the discordant thoughts/beliefs, (b) by changing the
behavior that is related to the inconsistency, or (c) by adding new thoughts which allow
us to rationalize the inconsistency. For example, drinking alcohol is something that many
people enjoy doing, but also know that it is bad for their health. In order to reduce the
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cognitive dissonance that arises from these conflicting thoughts, one must resolve the
inconsistencies. This can be done as Festinger (1957) suggests, by changing one of the
thoughts/beliefs. One may think “alcohol isn’t that bad for you”, which would change
one of the cognitions as a way of restoring consistency. Cognitive dissonance could also
be reduced by changing the behaviour that is related to the inconsistency, by refusing to
consume the alcoholic beverages, or consuming alcohol only once in a while. Finally, one
could also add a thought, such as “alcohol is bad for you, but I exercise and eat healthy so
it’s okay”, allowing them to rationalize the inconsistency.
In a recent study by Korcsog et al. (In Preparation), it was found that when
receiving social feedback about actions performed in the lab, disconfirmatory feedback
elicits cognitive dissonance. Undergraduate students were asked to either perform,
imagine, or listen to a prompt for a series of 120 actions. One week later, the students
rated their belief in the occurrence, vividness, and visual experience of their memory for
90 actions. The researcher then gave feedback about the participant’s memory for 12
actions, 6 of which were instances of disconfirmatory feedback (i.e., “You said
performed, that is incorrect. You imagined this action.” Or “You said imagined, that is
incorrect. You heard this action.”). It was found that the disagreement between the
researcher and the participant on the source of an event elicits cognitive dissonance in the
participant. This cognitive dissonance was assessed using Matz and Wood’s (2005)
Emotion Measure, whereby a heightened score on questions asking if a person is feeling
“uneasy”, “uncomfortable”, and “tense” represents dissonance discomfort. Van Veen and
colleagues (2009) have shown using fMRI that when experiencing cognitive dissonance,
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula of the brain are active. The
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magnitude of the activation of these two structures in turn predicts the subsequent attitude
change.
A Social-Cognitive Model of Memory
This brings into question the distinct underlying social-cognitive processes that
come into play when receiving feedback about memory. Scoboria and Henkel (2020)
outline a social-cognitive model of memory, the SCOboria Social-Cognitive Dissonance
Model of Challenges to Memory, which explains the processing of cognitive dissonance
that results when a person is told that their vivid memory did not actually occur in the
past. This model posits that when we receive social feedback that invalidates the
occurrence of remembered events, both intrapersonal and interpersonal cognitive
dissonance results. When processing intrapersonal cognitive dissonance, we tend to
weigh our own memory representation against the qualities of the feedback that has been
given (such as whether the feedback is plausible). When processing interpersonal
cognitive dissonance, we tend to weigh the potential costs and benefits of agreeing or
disagreeing with the feedback provider (e.g., will disagreeing with this person negatively
affect the relationship?). We are most often motivated to resolve both forms of
dissonance. Scoboria and Henkel (2020) suggest that in order to resolve dissonance, one
must evaluate the original memory, evaluate the social feedback, and then weigh the
potential costs and benefits of responding in the context of the relationship. Only then can
we either choose to maintain or reduce our belief in the occurrence of the event, and
choose to agree with, disagree with, or to not communicate this decision about belief in
occurrence to the challenger. Four outcomes may arise from this model: compliance,
event denial, event relinquishment, and memory defense (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Scoboria and Henkel’s (2020) social-cognitive model of memory. When an
individual receives social feedback from a challenger that a memory that they currently
believe to be true did not occur, this results in 1) intrapersonal dissonance and 2)
interpersonal dissonance. Intrapersonal dissonance is processed by evaluating the
qualities of the feedback against the qualities of the memory, resulting in the decision to
maintain or decrease belief in occurrence for the event. Interpersonal dissonance is
processed by evaluating the costs and benefits of agreeing or disagreeing with the other
person about the memory. Crossing these dimensions results in four possible outcomes
for the memory (bottom right).

Belief in Occurrence
When an event is remembered, the re-perception or recollection is not the only
mental experience that occurs; the event is usually believed to have truly occurred in the
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past. It is important to note however, that the presence of a recollection does not always
mean that belief in the event exists (Scoboria et al., 2014). The term belief in occurrence
(or autobiographical belief) is defined as the level of truth attributed to the occurrence of
an event, whether or not that event is truly recollected (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey,
2010; Scoboria et al., 2004). Scoboria et al. (2004) postulate that plausibility, belief, and
memory are nested constructs that are related to the perceived occurrence of an
autobiographical event. This is because, in most cases, if a person remembers an event,
they believe that it truly occurred in the past, and it will be regarded as plausible. For
example, research looking at false confessions conducted by Gudjonsson (2003), asserts
that when people confess to crimes that they did not actually commit, the first step in
confessing is determining that they could have plausibly committed the crime.
Sometimes people report vivid memories that they still recollect, but no longer
believe occurred to them; these memories are known as nonbelieved memories. Mazzoni,
Scoboria, and Harvey (2010) conducted the first empirical study of nonbelieved
memories, finding that approximately 20% of their sample reported having at least one
nonbelieved memory and that nonbelieved memories share many of the recollective
qualities that believed memories do. A recent study by Otgaar and colleagues (2019)
examined The False Memory Archive, a unique art collection that contains hundreds of
false memory reports, and found that of 500 submissions, 53.4% were nonbelieved
memories. According to Mazzoni, Scoboria, and Harvey (2010), one characteristic that is
uniquely associated with nonbelieved memories is the surprising intensity of negative
emotions. The authors suggest that this may be due to the nature of the remembered
event, or to the negative feelings surrounding the relinquishment of the memory. They
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also note that nonbelieved memories seem to be less personal and less connected to one’s
self-concept than memories for events that have never been doubted, likely due to having
less personal significance.
Belief in Accuracy
The term belief in accuracy refers to the degree to which an event is believed to
have occurred in the way it was recalled; that the details that come to mind correspond to
the details that were present when the event was experienced (Scoboria, Talarico, &
Pascal, 2015). As we now know, one characteristic of autobiographical memory is that it
can often be influenced by social input from others, and that our memory for the details
of an event can become quite fuzzy (Echterhoff & Hirst, 2009). It has been demonstrated
that when participants discuss past events with a confederate, they are much more likely
to incorporate the confederate’s recollection of the details of an event into their own
memory (Merckelbach, van Roermund, & Candel, 2006). Studies also show that it is
more likely that an incorrect detail will be implanted than it is to remove a correct detail
(Loftus, Levidow, and Duensing, 1992). This is because attempting to remove a correct
detail from someone’s memory requires misinformation that would contradict their prior
recollections. Inserting an incorrect detail can be done with misinformation that is
consistent with the scene itself, making it more plausible that the person could have just
missed that detail during the original encoding of the event in question.
Misinformation that stems from when a participant is accompanied by a
confederate can erase certain details from within memory reports (Wright et al., 2001;
Gabbert et al., 2006). The person may also decide to withhold the reporting of certain
details that they remember if the confederate pronounces a different account of an event,
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due to the social pressure of the situation. This subsequently allows the feedback that has
been given by the confederate to affect their memory for the details of the event. Gabbert
et al. (2006) and Wright et al. (2001) both agree that when one is recounting the details of
a scene by free-recall and another person suggests erroneous details and/or denies correct
details, this seems to be able to alter memory reports in a similar way.
Distinguishing Subtypes of Metamemory Beliefs
Brewer (1996) defines autobiographical remembering as being comprised of
multiple metamemorial components. First, he states that a memory image (recollection)
must be present. Second, he states that one must believe that the event occurred in the
past (autobiographical belief/belief in occurrence). Finally, one must possess confidence
that the details recalled accurately represent what has occurred in the past (belief in
accuracy). Belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy ratings are largely synonymous in
the literature, this is because spontaneous generation and laboratory experiments will
typically elicit memories for events that are vividly recollected, are believed to have
occurred, and are viewed to be accurate (Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). Scoboria, Talarico,
and Pascal (2015) describe this as being because research investigating belief in
occurrence and belief in accuracy tend to elicit memories for which both co-occur at high
levels.
In their investigation of the subtypes of nonbelieved memories, Scoboria, Nash,
and Mazzoni (2017) discovered several types of memories that participants rated belief in
accuracy and belief in occurrence similarly, including “weak nonbelieved memories”
(manipulations that question the recollective qualities of the memories), “grain-of-doubt
nonbelieved memories” (procedures undermining the objective plausibility of the
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memory), and of course, believed memories. They discuss that the objective plausibility
of events and social influence interact with other characteristics when determining the
level of belief in accuracy for nonbelieved memories, which is why it may have been
rated similarly to belief in occurrence in the “weak nonbelieved memories” and “grainof-doubt nonbelieved memories” categories.
Belief in Accuracy and Belief in Occurrence are Distinct
It has recently been suggested that belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and
recollection are theoretically distinct aspects of autobiographical remembering. In one
study by Scoboria, Talarico, and Pascal (2015), it was newly established that belief in
accuracy and belief in occurrence may be distinct metamemorial processes. The authors
found that each emerged as a distinct latent variable in their confirmatory modelling
process. This distinction suggests that it is possible to edit the details within a memory
without altering the overarching autobiographical belief appraisals. Korcsog (2017)
attempted to further investigate this distinction, using simple scenes of an actress
performing everyday tasks (e.g., making a sandwich). With the goal of further
demonstrating the distinction between belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy in a
controlled experimental setting, the researchers provided participants with feedback about
their memory that was either confirmatory or disconfirmatory towards memory accuracy
and occurrence. When participants were given negative feedback about belief in
occurrence and positive feedback about the accuracy of their recollection, a decrease in
belief in occurrence ratings emerged and there was no change in belief in accuracy
ratings, demonstrating a dissociation between the two metamemory appraisals.
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As one of the first studies to attempt to separate these constructs experimentally,
Korcsog’s (2017) results elucidated an unexpected artifact whereby the feedback about
belief in occurrence was targeting source monitoring rather than belief in occurrence.
This was because, instead of telling the participant that they had not been presented with
a scene (that they had in fact seen), they told participants that they had actually heard the
scene (rather than having watched it as a video), creating source monitoring confusion
between visual and auditory stimuli. Recently, this flaw has been addressed and
corrected. Korcsog et al. (In Preparation) found that when participants receive
disconfirmatory feedback about scene occurrence (“you were incorrect in saying that a
scene of a girl __ was presented in session 1”), belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence
scores both decrease. When participants receive disconfirmatory feedback about the
accuracy of their memory for scenes (“you remembered less than 50% of the details
correctly”), belief in occurrence ratings remained the same, but belief in accuracy scores
decreased. These findings demonstrate a partial dissociation between belief in occurrence
and belief in accuracy, suggesting that they are nested constructs. It is suggested that
belief in occurrence may act as an overarching construct, since in this experiment, having
belief in the accuracy of memory depended on having belief in the occurrence of it.
Believing that you are accurate about your memory is often thought to go handin-hand with believing that the remembered event occurred, however as previously
discussed, it has been shown that it is possible to possess a strong recollection of an event
but not believe that the event occurred. Similarly, it is also possible to possess strong
belief that a scene is recalled correctly in the absence of a belief that it occurred. For
example, Scoboria, Nash, and Mazzoni (2017) isolated a cluster of Classic NBMs
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(defined as having low belief ratings and high recollection ratings) in which belief in
accuracy remained high, encompassing cases such as “borrowed memories”. In these
cases, a person recalls an event and can corroborate the details, yet also discovers that
they had not truly been present and had instead learned the details from another person.
The phenomenon of borrowed memories was also studied by Korcsog (2018), in
which the author endeavored to separate belief in accuracy ratings from belief in
occurrence ratings. To do this, participants were provided with feedback about their
memory for certain central details within scenes of an actress performing simple tasks
(the same scenes as in Korcsog (2017) and as in the current study). This was done with
the goal of isolating and affecting only the participant’s belief in the accuracy appraisals
of their memory (while not affecting their belief in occurrence appraisals of the scene).
What was found was that when participants received disconfirmatory feedback about the
accuracy of their memory, the change in accuracy ratings was significantly greater than
their belief in occurrence ratings, again demonstrating a distinction between the two
appraisals. This is not surprising considering that one can believe that certain aspects of
their memory are incorrect, but can still believe that the memory occurred, similar to
believed-not-remembered memories described by Mazzoni, Scoboria, and Harvey (2010).
Using a similar approach, Otgaar et al. (2018) examined the impact of social
feedback and objective false evidence on participants’ belief in occurrence, belief in
accuracy, and recollection. In this study, participants underwent a virtual reality
experience in which they were shown six different virtual reality scenes and were then
given a memory test asking about belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and
recollection for the experienced scenes. After a one-week delay, participants returned to
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the lab and were either suggestively told that one of the events was not experienced,
received objective false evidence that the event did not occur, a combination of both, or
received nothing. The findings suggest that these manipulations predominantly decreased
participants’ belief in occurrence, demonstrating that belief in occurrence is more
receptive to social demands than belief in accuracy or recollection, further distinguishing
the three.
Autobiographical Memory in the Brain
Similar to investigations aimed at distinguishing memory processes using reports
of past events, neuroscientists are also tasked with determining the form and function of
brain structures involved in various memory processes. One of the most well-known
findings in the area of neuroscience is that damage to the medial temporal lobes and
hippocampus result in impaired memory processes (Scoville & Milner, 1957). This and
subsequent studies lead to the understanding that episodic memories are neurologically
dissociable from short-term and working memory (Moscovitch et al., 2016). Importantly,
Jacobsen (1936) demonstrated that the prefrontal cortex also plays a significant role in
working memory. In his study, the pre- and post-operative records of monkeys who had
underwent bilateral and unilateral ablation of the prefrontal cortex were examined. He
found that after bilateral ablation of the frontal association areas, the monkey would
experience a permanent loss of capacity for working memory.
The prefrontal cortex is also proposed to be one of the major areas of the brain
that are involved in specific components of autobiographical memory. Miller and Cohen
(2001) describe the prefrontal cortex as being able to coordinate distributed brain activity
to accomplish goals, since it is able to flexibly and dynamically implement domain-
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general, top-down, cognitive control processes. Milner and Petridas (1984) investigated
the effects of focal prefrontal cortical lesions on tests of long-term contextual memory
and found that these lesions resulted in reduced output on fluency tasks, poor regulation
of behaviour of external cues, impaired organization, poor monitoring of materials that
were to be remembered, and decreased responses to stimuli.
In his work on the Basic Systems Model of Memory, Rubin (2006) described that
when recalling autobiographical memories, several areas of the brain are active. He states
that there is activity in the explicit memory system, referencing Addis et al. (2004) who
found that when participants retrieve specific autobiographical memories, the associated
activation is in regions involved in imagery in episodic memory such as the left
precuneus, the left superior parietal lobule, and the right cuneus. Rubin (2006) then
highlights the search-and-retrieval system, referencing Conway et al. (1999) who found
that the left frontal cortex (as well as the left inferior temporal and occipital lobes) was
active during the retrieval of autobiographical memories. They suggest that left frontal
activation during the retrieval of autobiographical memories reflects the operation of
control processes that are used to modulate the construction of autobiographical
memories in the posterior neocortical pathways. Next, Rubin (2006) outlines the
importance of the visual and spatial system in the recollection of autobiographical
memories, referencing Addis et al., (2004) who state that specific autobiographical
memories are composed of visual and contextual information, therefore rely on regions
such as the precuneus and the parietal regions. Finally, Rubin (2006) highlights the
emotion system as playing a role in memory, referring to the work of Greenberg et al.
(2005) who found that the amygdala, hippocampus, and right inferior frontal gyrus was

20

active during autobiographical retrieval but not semantic retrieval of memory. This
suggests that the emotional component of autobiographical memory is tied to these brain
regions.
Svoboda, McKinnon, and Levine (2006) provide a comprehensive meta-analysis
of studies investigating autobiographical memory in the brain. Existing theories of
memory and the findings summarized in their article suggest that the left-prefrontal
cortex plays a significant role in autobiographical remembering. They also highlight that
in many of the studies that they reviewed, the hippocampus, amygdala, and the
cerebellum are active when one is retrieving autobiographical memories. Another
important finding was that there is a shift in lateralization (from left-hemisphere to midbrain) of the autobiographical memory network caused by emotional events, whereby
there is activation in emotion-centered regions (such as the amygdala) and deactivation in
locations associated with cognitive processes (such as the frontal cortex).
Spreng and Grady (2010) investigated and compared the neural mechanisms
underlying autobiographical memory, prospective memory, and theory of mind,
demonstrating that the three share a common pattern of brain activity. Using fMRI, these
researchers determined that a common pattern included activation in midline structures in
the frontal and parietal lobes. This finding is largely consistent with the brain activity that
has been shown to be related to self- and other-referential processing (D’Argembeau et
al., 2008). It was also found that autobiographical memory, prospective memory, and
theory of mind tasks activate Default Mode Network (DMN) regions, yet it is still unclear
whether the DMN is actually responsible for these kinds of processing.
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The brain activity associated with false memories using the misinformation
paradigm has also been investigated. Okado and Stark (2005) used fMRI to examine
participants’ brain activity during the encoding of an event, and when receiving
misinformative feedback in order to see whether the neural activity during either phase
would predict what would be remembered. Specifically, the participants studied eight
vignettes (this was the original event phase), and shortly afterward they studied the same
vignettes but with changes to several details (the misinformation phase). It was found that
neural activity recorded during encoding of the original event phase and misinformation
phase predicted whether true or false information were later reported. . This study
highlights that the processes at play when encoding information play a critical role in
determining true and false memory outcomes in the misinformation paradigm, likely
because one must re-evaluate their memory when provided with discordant information.
New Frontiers: Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS)
Neurophysiological and neuroimaging techniques have contributed greatly to our
understanding of the structure and function of the human brain, as well as to the
underpinnings of many different neurological and psychiatric disorders. Many of the
researchers studying the neural coordinates of autobiographical memory retrieval use
neuroimaging devices such as Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) or
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) to investigate brain regions responsible for
memory and its related processes (Rubin, 2006). With increasing popularity in the area of
cognitive neuroscience, another way to investigate this phenomenon is using Functional
Near Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS).
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What is Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS)?
Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) is an emerging neuroimaging
technique that is commonly used to measure brain activation in clinical settings, in
emergency medicine, and in research. fNIRS is a non-invasive optical technique that uses
near-infrared light to measure changes in the concentration of oxygenated (HbO) and
deoxygenated (HbR) hemoglobin in the cortex, to identify the level of cerebral
oxygenation in vivo (Rossi et al., 2012). The founder of in vivo NIRS is Frans Jöbsis-van
der Vliet, who actually discovered its utility when he noticed that red light could
penetrate through a 4-mm-thick bone of a beef steak when being held against visible
light. He then moved to more relevant avenues when he demonstrated the application of
NIRS in laboratory animals (Vliet, 1999) and for bedside monitoring of cerebral
oxygenation in sick newborn infants (Brazy et al., 1985). The first fNIRS human study
utilizing a single-site measurement was published in 1993 (Hoshi & Tamura, 1993).
Since then, fNIRS has been used to study many different brain-related diseases,
disorders, and functions. Research areas such as Alzheimer’s disease, depression,
memory, language, the brain-computer interface and pain have been studied using fNIRS
over the last 30 years (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012).
How does fNIRS Function?
The human brain undergoes a number of physiological changes as it responds to
stimuli. By measuring the change in the oxygenation of hemoglobin molecules in the
blood, fNIRS is able to quantify the level and location of neural activity in the brain.
These changes in blood levels and electrochemical activity also affect its optical
properties (Bunce et al., 2006). This is because the absorption spectrum of hemoglobin is
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largely dependent on its level of oxygenation. There are two principles that NIRS relies
upon: (1) that the tissue is transparent enough that near-infrared light can shine through
(the NIR spectral window is 650-1000nm), and (2) that there are compounds within that
tissue (chromophores) for which the absorption of light is dependent on the oxygenation
of that tissue (Bakker et al., 2012). The moderately high attenuation of NIR light in tissue
is due to hemoglobin, which is located in small blood vessels in the brain such as the
capillary, arteriolar, and venular beds (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012).
The Hemodynamic Response. Changes in cerebral blood flow and blood
oxygenation occur upon neural activation in the brain. This hemodynamic response is
described as an increase in the blood flow to the cortical tissue when there is an increased
level of activity in certain brain regions (Bauernfeind et al., 2014). For brief sensory
events, the hemodynamic response is delayed in onset and occurs about 2 seconds after
neuronal activity (Blamire et al., 1992). This increase in neural activity causes a drop in
glucose and oxygen stores, triggering a neurochemical cascade which results in the
vasodilation of the blood vessels to the active brain area. This in turn, causes an influx of
blood that is rich in oxygenated hemoglobin, reaching a state of equilibrium after
approximately 30 seconds (Bauernfeind et al., 2014; Tak & Ye, 2014).
The canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) is widely used in fNIRS
and fMRI research and is an essential step in the statistical analysis of both modalities of
data collection. The typical hemodynamic response in adults has been well-established
and demonstrates an increase in oxygenated and total hemoglobin concentrations and a
decrease in deoxygenated hemoglobin concentration with demonstrated reproducible and
consistent results (Plichta et al., 2006, 2007). By using this a-priori knowledge of what
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functional activity for the task should look like (i.e., peak of the canonical hemodynamic
response), data collected via fNIRS can be compared to this model in order to determine
the overall fit, which is represented by General Linear Model (GLM)-generated “peak”
beta coefficients.
NIRS techniques. There are three different NIRS techniques that are used, each
of which are based on a different type of illumination. The first is the continuous-wave
(CW) modality, which is based on the constant illumination of the tissue to measure the
light attenuation through the head. Second is the frequency-domain (FD) method, which
illuminates the head with intensity-modulated light, measuring both attenuation and the
phase delay of the emerging light. Lastly, the time-domain (TD) technique illuminates the
head with short pulses of light and then detects the shape of the pulse after its propagation
through the tissue (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012). Ferrari and Quaresima (2012) add that
only the FD and TD techniques fully characterize the optical properties of the tissues
(absorption and reduced scattering coefficients), which makes it possible to retrieve
absolute oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin concentrations.
In the current study, the frequency-domain method is utilized by our ISS Imagent
System (ISS Medical, 2016). The data to be collected includes information regarding the
average magnitude (DC), amplitude (AC), and the phase of the signals, for each channel.
Each data collection cycle contains an average waveform for each light source, resulting
in 16 sets of data per cycle for a system with eight sources (each containing a paired fiber
optic cable carrying 690 and 830nm light) and two detectors.
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Advantages of Using fNIRS
The major advantages of optical techniques are the specificity, the temporal
resolution (which is in the millisecond range), the potential to measure
intracellular/intravascular events simultaneously, and the ease with which devices can be
transported (Pinti et al., 2018). Because of this, and the fact that it is non-invasive and
safe, fNIRS has become quite popular in many different settings. By utilizing laser diodes
that span the optical window of 650-1000nm, and flexible fibre-optic cables to carry the
NIR light from the source to the detector, fNIRS can be used in different head positions
and postures (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012). The placement of the apparatus can be done in
natural environments without the need for restraint or sedation. Similar to fMRI, fNIRS
systems rely on similar principles of cerebrovascular activity. However, fNIRS is much
less expensive to buy and maintain, is safe for those for whom MRI would be unsafe
(e.g., those with metallic implants, those with past surgery, and those with
claustrophobia), and is more portable and thus creates more natural testing situations.
This allows for standard psychological and neuropsychological testing to be conducted
without the need for much adaptation (Ferrari, Ferrari, & Quaresima, 2007; Noah et al.,
2015). Like fMRI, the changes in blood oxygenation that occur in response to certain
tasks or stimuli can be measured, and these changes can be attributed to differing levels
and locations of cortical activity (Fantini, 2014; Scarapicchia et al., 2017). fMRI relies on
the Blood Oxygen-Level Dependent (BOLD) signal to measure only deoxygenated
hemoglobin, whereas fNIRS measures both oxygenated (HbO) and deoxygenated (HbR)
hemoglobin, thus allowing for a better understanding of the hemodynamic forces
occurring in the brain (Bakker et al., 2012).

26

Disadvantages of Using fNIRS
It is clear that there are many advantages to using fNIRS as a neuroimaging
device, however there are several disadvantages that should also be discussed. fNIRS has
low spatial resolution, and its penetration depth is only about 1.5-2 centimeters. This
means that it is impossible to gather information related to structure and anatomy of the
brain (Pinti et al., 2018). As well, fNIRS is susceptible to motion errors (however, all
imaging modalities encounter motion artifact limitations), nonetheless several techniques
have been developed to correct for them (Scholkmann et al., 2010; Brigadoi et al., 2014).
Potentially the most substantial limitation is the lack of standardization in the preprocessing and data analysis procedures used when conducting studies with fNIRS; to
date there is neither an agreement nor guidelines on the analysis of fNIRS data as in other
well-established technologies like fMRI (Pinti et al., 2018; Pinti et al., 2019).
fNIRS Data Analysis
Since fNIRS was developed, it has grown rapidly, with the number of
publications doubling every 3.5 years (Boas et al., 2014). Recent advances in this
technology have allowed researchers to examine neurovascular physiology with both
increased resolution and quality. However, due to the rapid increase in new users
employing various commercial software’s using various different fNIRS machines, there
is increasing concern that many studies may be biased by suboptimal processing methods
(Pfiefer et al., 2018). Hocke et al. (2018) state that due to the lack of standardized and
automated processing and analysis of fNIRS data, it is difficult to reproduce studies,
which can ultimately result in the misinterpretation of data by both novice and
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experienced fNIRS researchers. Because of this, the current position on both fNIRS preprocessing and statistical analyses is discussed.
Pre-processing of fNIRS data. In a recent review by Pinti et al. (2019), the issue
of heterogeneity in the analytic approaches and pre-processing procedures within the
realm of fNIRS research are brought to light. The authors outline a sequence of four steps
that should be followed when designing an fNIRS study (see Figure 2). Step three of this
model focuses specifically on the pre-processing phase of fNIRS data analysis, which is
when raw intensity fNIRS data are visually inspected in order to assess the signals’
quality (i.e., to determine the presence and magnitude of large motion artifacts, heartbeat
oscillations), and then adjusted. fNIRS signals generally contain two types of noise:
physiological noise and non-physiological noise. Physiological noise includes systemic
interference that is driven by changes in blood pressure due to cardiac processes,
respiration, Mayer waves, and low-frequency oscillations (Elwell et al., 1999; Saager &
Berger, 2008; Gregg et al., 2010) or indirectly by head/body movements (von Luhmann
et al., 2020). On the other hand, non-physiological noise involves motion artifacts that are
caused by optode-scalp decoupling (Cooper et al., 2012; Brigadoi et al., 2014) and other
instrumental noise. In order to ensure that the fNIRS data is correct and therefore useful,
any source of variability in the oxygenated (HbO) and deoxygenated (HbR) hemoglobin
that is not related to the hemodynamic activity evoked by a task should be removed or
minimized.
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Figure 2. A typical fNIRS experimental pipeline as outlined by Pinti et al. (2019).

Pinti et al. (2019) discuss that digital filtering (a mathematical procedure) is
applied in order to reduce or enhance certain aspects of input signals. These digital filters
are divided into three classes: (1) high-pass filters, which are used to remove high
frequency components above the cut-off frequency; (2) low-pass filters, which are used
to remove low frequency components that are below the cut-off frequency; and (3) bandpass filters which are used to preserve the frequency range between a lower and a higher
cut-off frequency. Pinti et al. (2019) stress that the pre-processing pipeline followed by
researchers is exceedingly important, since this data manipulation can impact subsequent
group-level statistical analyses. In other words, a mistake made during data preprocessing can render your study’s findings as useless.
Huppert (2016) provides a review of the noise structures that can often be seen in
fNIRS data, highlighting the impact that noise can have on some statistical tests. When
the assumptions of statistical tests are violated by properties of fNIRS such as serially
correlated noise due to physiology or outliers in the normal noise distribution due to
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motion artifacts, Huppert (2016) suggests two possible ways of remediating the problem.
First, we can remove the noise/artifacts from the data. However, a common problem with
this is that there is no perfect method of removing all types of artifacts. This in turn,
makes it subjective and thus relies upon the researcher’s expertise to select and use the
signal processing tools correctly. If noise is incompletely removed, assumptions of the
statistical model can still be violated, leading to inaccurate reporting of the results. A
second suggested approach to handling noise artifacts is to leave the data alone and
instead change the assumptions of the statistical model, allowing for a more generalized
model that can handle the properties of the artifact without violating assumptions.
Von Luhmann and colleagues (2020a; 2020b) agree that in order to recover
underlying brain activation patterns during pre-processing, researchers need to carefully
remove or modify these confounding factors from the fNIRS signal. Therefore, these preprocessing corrections can either be applied prior to the hemodynamic response function
(HRF) estimation or, ideally, simultaneously with the HRF estimation as is the case with
the General Linear Model (Friston, 1994; Cohen-Adad et al., 2007). The General Linear
Model (GLM) is especially useful because it allows for the simultaneous extraction of the
evoked HRF while filtering confounding signals with the help of nuisance regressors
(short-separation fNIRS measurements) (Zhang et al., 2007; Saager & Berger, 2008;
Gagnon et al., 2011). Von Luhmann et al. (2020b) explain that this allows the contrast to
noise ratio (CNR) of the evoked hemodynamic brain activity to be increased, and the risk
of falsely classifying task-evoked systemic physiology instead of brain activity is
reduced. This therefore enhances accuracy, sensitivity, and specificity of fNIRS single
trial classification.
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Statistical analysis of fNIRS data. In a recent review by Yücel et al. (2017), the
authors describe that after the pre-processing phase and cleaning of the data are complete,
a statistical model is to be used to detect the differences in the level of hemoglobin
between pairs of tasks or between a task and baseline. As mentioned by von Luhmann et
al. (2020b), the current state-of-the-art analysis in fNIRS research is the General Linear
Model with Short-Separation regression (GLM with SS), which can be implemented
either during or after pre-processing. This method is important because it uses measured
hemoglobin changes modeled as linear combinations of regressors derived from the
timing of the stimulus events (Yücel et al., 2017). As highlighted by Tak and Ye (2014),
Huppert (2016) and Pinti et al. (2019), there is continued debate about the optimal model
to use with fNIRS data analysis in order to maximize sensitivity, and when to apply this
model is also in question (von Luhmann et al., 2020). As statistical methods continue to
be proposed and utilized, Yücel et al. (2017) describe that there is an increasing need for
more rigorous comparisons of the tradeoffs in the sensitivity and specificity of these
methods.
Past studies such as Murata et al. (2002) simply calculated the concentration
changes of hemoglobin oxygenation during their task period and then depicted the timeseries of cerebral oxygenation changes for visual inspection. Tak and Ye (2014) discuss
that such simple approaches as this are prone to error, particularly when the noise and
interference level increases. They discuss that various different statistical analysis
methods have been used in the past to compare means, including t-tests (Germon et al.,
1994; Hoshi et al., 2003), and multi-way ANOVAs (Arenth et al., 2007; Bartocci et al.
2000). The problem with these methods, however, is that the time course in fNIRS is
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directly related to the hemodynamic response, and when using these simple statistics,
information about the time course is lost.
In order to overcome some of these weaknesses, the General Linear Model
(GLM) began to be used, which assumes that data can be represented as a linear
combination of several sources or regressors (Friston et al., 2011). The first to apply the
GLM to analyze fNIRS data was Schroeter et al. (2004), and since then numerous authors
have employed this method of statistical analysis (Tak & Ye, 2014). A GLM is a flexible
generalization of an ordinary linear regression model which allows for the response
variables to have errors distributions other than the normal distribution. As mentioned,
this is what most researchers have agreed upon as best practice for fNIRS statistical
analyses today (Yücel et al., 2017). In a recent study by Jahani et al. (2017), the authors
estimated a hemodynamic response function (HRF) by using a GLM, which was then
used to attain information about the time course of the data in the form of beta
coefficients. Paired student’s t-tests were then conducted on these beta coefficients to
evaluate the statistically significant differences in hemodynamic responses to their
stimuli. Of course, due to multiple comparisons often leading to an inflated type I error
rate, a Benjamini-Hochberg multiple comparison correction is recommended to be
applied (Jahani et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2020). This is the approach that was followed in the
current study, as it is deemed to be the leading method of statistical analysis of fNIRS
data.
The Current Study
This research project was designed to explore the neural activity of healthy adults’
metamemorial appraisals of belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy using Functional
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Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS). The results of this study will provide the first
investigation of the neurological plausibility of Scoboria’s (2020) model, thus allowing
for the cortical dissociation between the metamemorial appraisals of belief in accuracy
and belief in occurrence to be made. Therefore, this study aims to demonstrate
differential activation patterns based on cognitive consistency and dissonance. The
preceding literature review demonstrates the importance of understanding these
appraisals, highlighting the impact that feedback from others can have on remembering.
In order to understand the broad effects of disconfirmatory social feedback, we must first
appreciate the distinct underlying cognitive mechanisms at play.
When memories are challenged by others, this can lead to changes in one’s belief
in the occurrence and/or the accuracy of their memory. Past research (Scoboria, Talarico,
& Pascal, 2015; Korcsog 2017; Korcsog 2018; Korcsog et al., In Preparation) has
demonstrated that experimentally providing disconfirmatory feedback about scene
occurrence and the content of a scene results in a distinction between belief in accuracy
and belief in occurrence appraisals. Korcsog (2017; 2018) and Korcsog et al. (In
Preparation) were the first to use procedures that implemented stimuli with a narrative
structure, reflecting the narrative coherence that Rubin (2006) describes autobiographical
memories to have. The next step in this line of research is to investigate whether the
regions of the brain that are active when receiving and evaluating feedback about
occurrence and accuracy are distinct in their location and/or their level of activation in the
brain.
The first research question is whether the level and location of oxygenated
hemoglobin in the left prefrontal cortex will differ when participants receive feedback
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about the occurrence vs. the accuracy of their memory. Conway et al., (1999) found that
the left frontal cortex was active during the retrieval of autobiographical memories, and
so a left frontal cortical array was created in order to measure activation when
participants receive feedback about their memory. It was hypothesized that there will in
fact be a difference in activation, since it has been demonstrated that despite being rated
highly synonymously, these appraisals can be dissociated (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal,
2015; Korcsog, 2017; Korcsog, 2018; Otgaar et al., 2018; Korcsog et al., In Preparation).
Because of this proposed dissociation, the neurocognitive mechanisms that are used to
differentiate knowledge of memory occurrence and accuracy may be distinct. As well,
research on the mental construction of details versus the mental construction of whole
scenes demonstrates that different brain regions contribute to each. In one study by
Summerfield, Hassabis, & MacGuire (2010), the mental construction of details activated
areas such as the hippocampus and the retrosplenial cortex, whereas the mental
construction of whole scenes activated the left and right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.
The second research question is whether there will be a distinction between the
level and location of brain activity associated with confirmatory vs. disconfirmatory
feedback about memory accuracy and occurrence. In other words, will the brain activity
associated with telling a person that they are correct about the occurrence of a memory
differ from when the same person is told that they are incorrect about the occurrence of
that memory (i.e., telling the participant that the event that they remembered did not
actually occur in the past). As well, will the left frontal activity associated with telling a
person that their description of a memory was accurate differ from telling a person that
their description of a memory (that was accurately recollected) was inaccurate? When
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participants receive disconfirmatory feedback, it was expected that they would
experience cognitive dissonance. One study by Van Veen and colleagues (2009)
describes that when people experience cognitive dissonance, the dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex and anterior insula are engaged. Because fNIRS is unable to measure the activity
of these deep brain structures, it is impossible to determine whether dissonance has
occurred. However, it has been demonstrated that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is
involved in decision making (Rosenbloom, Schmahmann, & Price, 2012) and in
reasoning (Goel & Dolan, 2004). Because of this, it is hypothesized that when given
disconfirmatory feedback about a memory, decision-making processes will come into
play in order to determine whether to accept or reject the feedback. This in turn, should
result in increased activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
In further exploration of the second research question, participants’ responses to
disconfirmatory feedback about memory accuracy and occurrence will be compared to
their belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence rating items. This will be done in order to
determine whether ratings reflecting relinquishment of memory show different patterns of
brain activation than ratings reflecting maintenance of memory. It was hypothesized that
regardless of whether participants chose to hold on to or relinquish their memory,
reasoning and decision-making processes would come into play, thus resulting in
increased activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
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CHAPTER 2
Method
Participants
Twenty-four participants were recruited through the University of Windsor
Participant Pool, and all participants apart from those who had a visual or auditory
impairment or those who had participated in a study with a similar deceptive component
in the past (i.e., The Actions Study 2014-2017 or Remembering Recorded Events 20172019) were eligible to participate. Of these 24 participants, 17 possessed adequate fNIRS
signal strength to be included in the statistical analyses (88% female, 68% Caucasian;
Mage = 21.94, SD = 4.18, range 19-31). All participants received academic credit for
completing the study, regardless of whether or not adequate fNIRS signal strength was
obtained.
Measures
Belief in Occurrence
Two items derived from Scoboria et al. (2004) were included to assess belief in
occurrence before and after the participant was challenged about their memory for the
occurrence of scenes. The items were measured using 7-point Likert-style scales and
were averaged to calculate the scale score. See Appendix A containing the verbatim
presentation of these questions.
Belief in Accuracy
Two items derived from Scoboria, Talarico, and Pascal (2015) were included to
assess belief in accuracy before and after the participant was given feedback about their
memory for the details within scenes. The items were measured using 7-point Likert-style
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scales and are averaged to calculate the scale score. See Appendix A for the verbatim
presentation of these questions.
Event Recordings
Sixty scenes were presented to each participant, 30 as silent videos and 30 as
audio recordings. There was a 5-second delay between each scene, where a black screen
with a white target was shown in order to re-direct attention to the computer screen. A
JVC Everio GZ-HM200 Dual SD High Definition Camcorder was used to record all of
the videos that were used as stimuli in this study and were recorded in October 2016 as a
part of Korcsog’s (2017; 2018) study. An ASUS Zenbook UX303UA-DH51T Intel i5
computer was also utilized in October 2016 to record all the sound recordings that were
presented in this study. Each of the recorded scenes were under 35 seconds in length and
contained at least four steps, with all of the scenes being neutral in nature and relatively
simple (see Appendix B for a list of the titles of the scenes that were presented to
participants, and Appendix C for a list of the titles of the scenes that were prompted but
never presented). Each scene depicted the same actress, a 15-year old girl, who gave
permission for the recordings to be used. The scenes were kept relatively similar,
meaning that they all consisted of the same actress, wearing the same clothes, doing
everyday tasks. All items used in the scenes were common household objects. A sample
of what three of the scenes looked like is found in Figure 3, and a sample transcription of
what one of the auditory scenes sounded like is provided in Appendix F.
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Figure 3. Three examples of simple scenes that were presented to participants, also
presented in Korcsog (2018). From top to bottom the scenes are: A girl washing dishes, a
girl hitting a baseball, and a girl making a sandwich. Each video-recorded scene was
under 35 seconds in length and consisted of at least 3 steps. The videos were muted so
participants would receive only visual stimulation.

fNIRS Probe Placement
The NIRS probe was designed using AtlasViewerGUI software (Aasted et al.,
2015). The probe design and the probe itself can be seen in Figure 4. The probe consists
of eight sources and two detectors, with short-separation channels being 10mm apart and
long-separation channels being 30mm apart. There are 16 channels containing two
different wavelengths, totaling a total of 32 channels. This probe covers the left prefrontal
cortex (Figure 4; Brodmann’s areas 8, 9, 10, 44, & 45).
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Figure 4. Pictorial depiction of the configuration of the fNIRS array as displayed by
AtlasViewerGUI. The red numbers denote the optode locations and the blue numbers
denote the detector locations. The anatomical landmarks derived from the 10-20 system
are labelled in black.

fNIRS System
Data were acquired using the ISS Imagent System (ISS Medical, 2016) which
utilizes laser diodes at 690 and 830nm and acquires signals from the photo-detectors at a
modulation frequency of 110Hz. ISS Imagent (ISS Medical, 2016) is a frequency-domain
(FD) system consisting of 16 optical channels, each with two wavelengths. The 10mW
average powered laser light is carried from the FD system to the head probe via optical
fibers and is delivered from the head probe back to the FD system through detector fiber
bundles.
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Procedure
Session 1
After completing the consent process, participants were asked to sit in front of a
computer and to put on the provided headphones. They were instructed to watch and
listen carefully to 30 silent videos and 30 audio-recorded descriptions (with no visual
stimuli) of an actress performing simple tasks (see Appendix B for a list of the titles of
these tasks that were presented during session 1). Each of these scenes were under 35
seconds in length, and the mode of presentation (video vs. audio) was counterbalanced
among participants. The recordings alternated randomly between video and audiorecorded scenes, with a 5-second delay in between each scene. See Figure 3 for a visual
depiction of these scenes and Appendix F for a transcription of an audio-recorded scene.
Session 2
Session 2 took place exactly one week after session 1 and was divided into two
parts: Phase 1 and Phase 2. During Phase 1, termed “The Recognition Phase”,
participants were asked questions about their memory for 90 scenes. 30 questions were
about scenes that were presented as a video, 30 questions were about scenes that were
presented as an audio-recording, and 30 questions were about scenes that were never
actually presented (see Appendix C for a list of the titles of scenes that were prompted,
but never actually presented to participants). First, participants were asked whether each
scene was presented in session 1. If they answered “yes”, they were then asked if the
scene was presented as a video or as an audio recording. Then, they were asked to
describe the scene. Finally, the participant was asked to rate their belief in the occurrence
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and belief in the accuracy of their memory using the aforementioned scales found in
Appendix A.
During Phase 2, “The Feedback Phase”, the Functional Near-Infrared
Spectroscopy (fNIRS) was set-up and feedback was administered whilst recording each
participant’s brain activity. At least two researchers were present for this portion of the
study, one of them provided the feedback to the participant while the other ran the fNIRS
machine and created time-stamps when each form of feedback was given. The researcher
who was running the fNIRS data collection was laser safety trained and had been
thoroughly trained on fNIRS safety protocol. Anatomical landmarks of the skull were
measured using the 10-20 system (commonly used in EEG research), and temporary
markings were made using medical tape to indicate the positions that the left prefrontal
array were to be oriented in. Once the landmarks were set, the neoprene cap was secured
using a combination of Velcro and fabric straps (in order to ensure a snug and
comfortable fit). This cap held the optode mounts, and for each participant, each mount
was examined in order to ensure that a clear view of the scalp was available, and hair was
parted or moved slightly using a soft plastic rod or Q-tip. After this, the optodes and
detectors, which were secured in a plastic enclosure, were secured to the cap’s mount.
Only at this time was the laser bank turned on in order to prevent accidental exposure to
the laser light during the mounting process.
Once the lasers were turned on, the data collection software was initiated, and an
automated signal optimization process was carried out. If any of the optodes needed to be
adjusted due to poor signal strength (i.e., due to having an obstructed view of the scalp
due to hair), the laser bank was turned off before the optode in question was removed,
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cleared, and reseated. After adequate signal strength was confirmed, the software was set
to record. The data captured includes: a timestamp of the data point (system time, in
seconds), the marker that was set (to signal the feedback being given to the participant,
the end of the feedback, and after a 10 second delay, the beginning of the questioning),
and three forms of signals for each of the source-detector pairs (16 pairs in the current
set-up): amplitude, the moving average value, and the phase/variance of the signal. No
identifying information was recorded through this software, and participant data was
deidentified by use of a participant number and condition (e.g., 07.B2).
There were 10 instances of feedback about randomly selected scenes that
participants had accurately remembered as being presented as a video in session 1. Each
instance of feedback had an epoch length of approximately 35-40 seconds in order for the
hemodynamic response to reset. For 2 scenes, participants were given positive feedback
about event occurrence (i.e., “you were correct in saying that a scene of a girl ___ was
presented”), for 2 scenes participants were given negative feedback about event
occurrence (i.e., “you were incorrect in saying that a scene of a girl __ was presented”),
for 2 scenes participants were given positive feedback about memory accuracy (i.e., “in
the scene of a girl __ you remembered more than 90% of the details correctly”) and for 2
scenes participants were given negative feedback about memory accuracy (i.e., “in the
scene of a girl __ you remembered less than 50% of the details correctly”). Finally, there
were 2 scenes for which participants did not receive any feedback about their memory
(i.e., “please re-rate the scene __”), which acted as a control condition. For a summary of
the feedback conditions, see Table 1. Participants were asked to re-rate all 10 of these
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scenes with the same belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence items as used before
receiving social feedback (see Appendix A).

Table 1.
A summary table depicting all five forms of social feedback presented to participants.
Belief in Accuracy

Belief in Occurrence

+

“ In your description of the scene
________, you remembered more
than 90% of the details correctly.”

“ You were correct in saying that
a scene of a girl __________ was
presented.”

-

“In your description of the scene
_________, you remembered less
than 50% of the details correctly.”

“You were incorrect in saying
that a scene of a girl ________
was presented.”

0

“Please re-rate the scene _______.”

Note. The “+” denotes positive/confirmatory feedback, the “-“ denotes
negative/disconfirmatory feedback, and the “0” denotes no feedback/control.

After the completion of the study, participants were asked the following
questions: “What do you think that we are studying today?” and “how did you feel when
you were told that you recalled some of the scenes incorrectly?”. Participants were then
read a debriefing statement explaining why the use of deception in the study is necessary,
and that the feedback given in this study is not indicative of their true memory abilities.
They were informed as to which items they received deceptive feedback about. Then, the
utility of the fNIRS was explained to each participant before asking whether they agreed
for us to keep their data. Finally, each participant was asked what it was like for them to
participate in our study and whether they had any questions before being prompted to
leave (see Appendix D for the debriefing script).
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The recorded fNIRS data was saved into a text file (.txt) with the time and date of
the recording, as well as the participant’s code. The laser bank was turned off, and the
optodes and cap were removed from each participant. The surfaces of the optodes and
their holders were disinfected with wipes, and the participant was provided with paper
towel and a mirror to remove any perspiration that may have accumulated on their scalp
and to re-style their hair. The participants’ data was later converted to a MATLAB
compatible .NIRS file for pre-processing.
Data Analysis and Statistics
fNIRS Data Pre-Processing
Both during and after the completion of each of the 24 participants, the data was
visually inspected using the BOXY software provided by ISS Imagent (ISS Medical,
2016) in order to determine whether signal strength and quality was adequate. Of the 24
recruited participants, 17 participants were deemed to have adequate signal strength and
quality, and thus were included in the analyses. The guidelines for establishing adequate
signal quality by Orihuela-Espina et al. (2010) were used, which included obtaining an
average amplitude (AC signal) of greater than 100, magnitude (DC signal) of 2000, and a
signal variance (phase) of less than 10. Pre-processing of the data was completed using
Homer2 Toolbox (Huppert et al., 2009), MATLAB, and NIRS-SPM MATLAB scripts
(Ye, Tak, Jan, Jung, & Jang, 2009). Using a Boxy2Homer MATLAB script, the data
were converted from a raw text file exported from BOXY into a NIRS format that
Homer2 was able to process (Huppert et al., 2009). Light intensity data were converted to
hemodynamic data using the optical density and modified Beer-Lambert Law commands
(Yücel et al., 2016) available in the Homer2 processing stream (Huppert et al., 2009).
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Because the hemodynamic signal moves along a temporal continuum over time, and thus
starts to drift, a first order polynomial drift correction was implemented. This is a
conventional method to eliminate system drift from the fNIRS device (Orihuela-Espina et
al., 2010). In order to partially remove the effects of cardiac and respiratory noise on the
signal and to reduce motion artifacts, a low-pass filter (0.5Hz) and a high-pass filter
(0.02Hz) were applied to the data.
Slow-wave oscillations (e.g., Mayer Waves) can overlap with the hemodynamic
response, thus making it difficult to remove without removing the signal from cortical
activity (Tak & Ye, 2014). However, leaving Mayer waves in the signal can also
inadvertently inflate type-I error (Pinti et al., 2019). Therefore, to allow for the removal
of noise that is attributable to surface-level effects, short signal optodes that capture
surface-level vascular changes were used as covariates for the deeper optodes using the
short-signal GLM algorithm (Gagnon et al., 2011). Short-signal separation has become a
widely used method to remove physiological noise from the cortical signal and is an
effective means of reducing signal contamination without compromising the true cortical
signal (Tak & Ye, 2014). After this was implemented, the resulting processing stream
was considered to be a relatively pure concentration function for oxygenated,
deoxygenated, and total hemoglobin for each channel, which consists of only cortical
signal changes.
The processed signals were further separated by time into epochs based on
experimental events. For the purposes of this study, the pre-event phase was during the
feedback that was read to the participant, and the post-event phase was the 20 seconds
after the feedback was given. The average activation pattern across each channel for each
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epoch was produced using run-based processing which averages each participant’s signal
across multiple trials. These analyses were conducted across groups (type of feedback),
averaging these runs across participants.
The separation of the signals between the channels was optimized using a shortsignal GLM algorithm (Gagnon et al., 2014). This algorithm contains a GLM with a
modified gamma function, which is able to effectively separate the hemodynamic
response from each epoch’s baseline. This allows for a clear and interpretable graph of
the hemodynamic response to be created. The hemodynamic response function (HRF)
was then estimated by using a general linear model (GLM) which uses the least squares
method for estimating the beta coefficients of the consecutive basis functions. The GLM
is especially important because it is used to incorporate the time course of the whole HRF
for each subject, by generating beta coefficients by use of a linear regression analysis.
Statistical Analyses
For the statistical analyses of the pre-processed fNIRS data (which at this point,
are in the form of GLM-generated beta coefficients), paired Student’s t-tests were used to
evaluate statistically significant differences in hemodynamic responses to each feedback
condition in the time range of 5-10 seconds. This time range was used because this is
when the hemodynamic response signal reaches its peak. Because of the large number of
comparisons made using the paired Student’s t-tests, a multiple comparison correction
was applied using the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate (FDR) method with a
false discovery rate of 0.05. For the analyses of the change in belief in occurrence and
belief in accuracy ratings (pre- vs. post-feedback) based on feedback condition, mean
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change scores [post-pre] and 95% confidence intervals were calculated as per the
Cumming (2014) method.
For qualitative analyses of fNIRS data, such as the description of activation
profiles, the activation profiles provided for each epoch/condition within the Homer2
Toolbox (Huppert et al., 2009) and AtlasViewerGUI (Aasted et al., 2015) were used. The
group averages were imported into the AtlasViewerGUI program which was used to
better demonstrate the functional patterns on a brain model across the different feedback
conditions and across participant relinquishment type. This created a map of functional
activity on a standard brain atlas representing 3D space which allowed for easier visual
comparisons to be made across feedback conditions and across relinquishment types.
CHAPTER 3
Results
The influence of social feedback on memory was examined by the use of
Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) in order to determine whether the
neurocognitive mechanisms at play were distinct dependent on the type of social
feedback received, and on one’s response to this feedback. These analyses included the
examination of the contrasts between each fNIRS channel, hemoglobin type (HbO, HbR,
HbT), and condition (see Table 1), as well as between pre- and post-scores on the belief
in accuracy and belief in occurrence rating scales (Appendix A).
fNIRS Analyses
The group mean (n=17 participants) temporal traces of the oxy-hemoglobin
(HbO), deoxy-hemoglobin (HbR), and total hemoglobin (HbT) concentration changes
from baseline levels after receiving different instances of social feedback are depicted in
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Table 2. These p-values represent the significance levels of paired Student’s t-tests
performed on the average beta coefficients obtained from 5-10 seconds of the
hemodynamic response function (HRF), representing the “peak hemodynamic response”.
A Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate (FDR) correction was applied to account
for multiple comparisons. The group mean spatial results averaged over 5-10 seconds are
also overlaid on brain surfaces for better visual presentation of the different brain regions
involved in the different conditions of social feedback (see Figures 5-9). Channel 3,2 and
6,2 were removed from the analyses due to poor overall signal quality across participants.
One participant was removed from the analyses for channel 5,2 due to poor signal
strength resulting in loss of data.
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Table 2.
Temporal traces of oxy-hemoglobin (HbO), deoxy-hemoglobin (HbR), and total
hemoglobin (HbT) concentration changes by feedback condition.
Channel

# of
Participan
ts
Included

MNI

Brod
mann
Area

Cortical
Region

1,1

17

-13
45 47

8

2,1

17

-15
55 35

9

3,1

17

-29
40 44

9

4,1

17

-30
54 29

10

4,2

17

-37
41 12

10

5,2

16

-48
28 28

45

Medial
Prefront
al
Cortex
Dorsola
teral/ant
erior
prefront
al
cortex
Dorsola
teral/ant
erior
prefront
al
cortex
Anterio
r
Prefront
al
Cortex
Anterio
r
Prefront
al
Cortex
Left
inferior
frontal
gyrus
opercul
aris

Ctrl
vs. +
Occ
HbO
HbR
HbT
.000
.000
.176

Ctrl
vs. +
Acc
HbO
HbR
HbT
.000
.000
.000

Ctrl vs.
- Occ
HbO
HbR
HbT
.000
.000
.000

Ctrl
vs. Acc
HbO
HbR
HbT
.000
.000
.000

+ Occ
vs. +
Acc
HbO
HbR
HbT
.000
.000
.000

+ Occ
vs. Acc
HbO
HbR
HbT
.000
.757
.000

+ Occ
vs. Acc
HbO
HbR
HbT
.000
.000
.000

+ Acc
vs. Acc
HbO
HbR
HbT
.119
.000
.000

+ Acc
vs. Occ
HbO
HbR
HbT
.000
.000
.000

- Occ
vs. Acc
HbO
HbR
HbT
.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.023
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.011
.000
.000

.623
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.015

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.071
.000

.000
.000
.000

.081
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.012
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

.000
.000
.000

Abbreviations. MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute and Hospital; Ctrl = Control; +
Occ = Positive Occurrence; + Acc = Positive Accuracy; - Occ = Negative Occurrence; Acc = Negative Accuracy; HbO = Oxygenated Hemoglobin; HbR = Deoxygenated
Hemoglobin; HbT = Total Hemoglobin. Note. Students’ paired samples t-tests were
conducted on beta coefficients resultant from the linear regression of hemoglobin
concentrations to the HRF. The depicted p-values were obtained from paired samples ttests conducted on “peak beta coefficients” obtained from the 5-10 second range.
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Figure 5. The average activation pattern of the control condition overlaid on a 3D image
of the brain.
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Figure 6. The average activation pattern of the “Positive Occurrence” condition overlaid
on a 3D image of the brain.
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Figure 7. The average activation pattern of the “Positive Accuracy” condition overlaid on
a 3D image of the brain.
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Figure 8. The average activation pattern of the “Negative Occurrence” condition overlaid
on a 3D image of the brain.
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Figure 9. The average activation pattern of the “Negative Accuracy” condition overlaid
on a 3D image of the brain.
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Does Oxygenated Hemoglobin Concentration and Location Differ Between
Occurrence and Accuracy Conditions?
To address the first research question asking whether the level and location of
oxygenated hemoglobin in the belief in accuracy conditions differs from the belief in
occurrence conditions, paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare the peak beta
coefficients across four conditions: positive accuracy, positive occurrence, negative
accuracy, and negative occurrence. For channel 1,1 (BA 8; left medial prefrontal cortex),
there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for
positive accuracy (M = 1.68 x 10-7, SD = 1.25 x 10-7) and positive occurrence (M = 1.41 x
10-8, SD = 2.91 x 10-8); t(195) = -18.53, p = .000; (d = 1.70). There was a significant
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = 1.68 x
10-7, SD = 1.25 x 10-7) and negative occurrence (M = 3.47 x 10-7, SD = 1.43 x 10-7);
t(195) = -11.22, p = .000; (d = 1.33). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated
hemoglobin concentration for positive occurrence (M = 1.41 x 10-8, SD = 2.92 x 10-8) and
negative accuracy (M = 1.84 x 10-7, SD =6.82 x 10-8); t(195) = -27.91, p = .000; (d =
3.27). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for
negative occurrence (M = 3.47 x 10-7, SD = 1.43 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 1.84
x 10-7, SD = 6.82 x 10-8); t(195) = -21.78, p = .000; (d = 1.45). These findings are shown
in Table 3.
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Table 3.
Channel 1,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about
accuracy and occurrence.

Pair 1

+ Acc

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
1.25 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

1.68 x
-18.53
195
-7
7
10
+ Occ
196
1.41 x
2.92 x 10-8
8
10
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
1.68 x
1.25 x 10- -11.22
195
.000**
-7
7
10
- Occ
196
3.47 x
1.43 x 10-7
7
10
Pair 3
+ Occ
196
1.41 x
2.92 x 10- -27.91
195
.000**
-8
8
10
- Acc
196
1.85 x
6.82 x 10-7
8
10
Pair 4
- Occ
196
3.47 x
1.43 x 10- -21.78
195
.000**
7
10-7
- Acc
196
1.85 x
6.82 x 108
10-7
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.

For channel 2,1 (BA 9; left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), there was a significant
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = -1.15
x 10-8, SD = 8.49 x 10-8) and positive occurrence (M = 1.76 x 10-7, SD = 9.59 x 10-8);
t(195) = 18.80, p = .000; (d = 2.07). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated
hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = -1.15 x 10-8, SD = 8.49 x 10-8) and
negative occurrence (M = 2.03 x 10-7, SD = 1.03 x 10-7); t(195) = -43.30, p = .000; (d =
2.23). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for
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Cohen’s d
1.70

1.33

3.27

1.45

positive occurrence (M = 1.76 x 10-7, SD = 9.59 x 10-8) and negative accuracy (M = 5.84
x 10-8, SD =5.75 x 10-8); t(195) = 15.66, p = .000; (d = 2.57). Finally, there was a
significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for negative
occurrence (M = 2.03 x 10-7, SD = 1.03 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 5.84 x 10-8,
SD =5.75 x 10-8); t(195) = 17.43, p = .000; (d = 1.74). These findings are shown in Table
4.

Table 4.
Channel 2,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about
accuracy and occurrence.

Pair 1

+ Acc

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
8.49 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

-1.15 x
18.80
195
-8
8
10
+ Occ
196
1.76 x
9.59 x 108
10-7
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
-1.15 x
1.25 x 10- -43.30
195
.000**
-8
7
10
- Occ
196
2.03 x
1.03 x 10-7
7
10
Pair 3
+ Occ
196
1.76 x
2.92 x 1015.66
195
.000**
-7
8
10
- Acc
196
5.84 x
5.75 x 10-8
8
10
Pair 4
- Occ
196
2.03 x
1.03 x 1017.43
195
.000**
-7
7
10
- Acc
196
5.84 x
5.75 x 10-8
8
10
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.
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Cohen’s d
2.07

2.28

2.57

1.74

For channel 3,1 (BA 9; left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), there was a significant
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = -2.18
x 10-7, SD = 8.51 x 10-8) and positive occurrence (M = -2.45 x 10-7, SD = 1.09 x 10-7);
t(195) = -2.57, p = .015; (d = 0.30). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated
hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = -2.18 x 10-7, SD = 8.51 x 10-8) and
negative occurrence (M = -5.55 x 10-8, SD = 4.83 x 10-8); t(195) = -28.20, p = .000. There
was no significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive
occurrence (M = -2.45 x 10-7, SD = 1.09 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = -2.51 x 10-7,
SD =8.88 x 10-8); t(195) = 0.49, p = .623. There was a significant difference in the
oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for negative occurrence (M = -5.55 x 10-8, SD =
4.83 x 10-8) and negative accuracy (M = -2.51 x 10-7, SD =8.88 x 10-8); t(195) = 20.60, p
= .000. These findings are shown in Table 5.
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Table 5.
Channel 3,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about
accuracy and occurrence.

Pair 1

+ Acc

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
8.51 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.015*

-2.18 x
-2.57
195
-7
8
10
+ Occ
196
-2.45 x
9.59 x 10-7
8
10
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
-2.18 x
8.51 x 10- -28.20
195
.000**
-7
8
10
- Occ
196
-5.55 x
4.83 x 10-8
8
10
Pair 3
+ Occ
196
-2.45 x
2.92 x 100.49
195
.623
-7
8
10
- Acc
196
-2.51 x
8.88 x 10-7
8
10
Pair 4
- Occ
196
-5.55 x
4.83 x 1020.60
195
.000**
8
10-8
- Acc
196
-2.51 x
8.88 x 108
10-7
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.

For channel 4,1 (BA 10; anterior prefrontal cortex), there was a significant
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for the positive accuracy
condition (M = 3.38 x 10-7, SD = 1.18 x 10-7) and positive occurrence (M = 5.86 x 10-9,
SD = 1.16 x 10-7); t(195) = -40.18, p = .000; (d = 2.84). There was a significant difference
in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = 3.38 x 10-7, SD =
1.18 x 10-7) and negative occurrence (M = 9.99 x 10-8, SD = 8.04 x 10-8); t(195) = 48.05,
p = .000; (d = 2.37). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
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Cohen’s d
0.30

2.36

0.09

2.75

concentration for positive occurrence (M = 5.86 x 10-9, SD = 1.16 x 10-7) and negative
accuracy (M = 8.40 x 10-8, SD =9.65 x 10-8); t(195) = -23.58, p = .000; (d = 1.09). There
was not a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for negative
occurrence (M = 9.99 x 10-8, SD = 8.04 x 10-8) and negative accuracy (M = 8.40 x 10-8,
SD =9.65 x 10-8); t(195) = 1.76, p = .081; (d = 0.18). These findings are shown in Table
6.

Table 6.
Channel 4,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about
accuracy and occurrence.

Pair 1

+ Acc

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
1.18 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

3.38 x
-40.18
195
-7
7
10
+ Occ
196
5.86 x
1.16 x 107
10-9
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
3.38 x
1.18 x 1048.05
195
.000**
-7
7
10
- Occ
196
9.99 x
8.04 x 10-8
8
10
Pair 3
+ Occ
196
5.86 x
2.92 x 10- -23.58
195
.000**
-9
8
10
- Acc
196
8.40 x
9.65 x 10-8
8
10
Pair 4
- Occ
196
9.99 x
8.04 x 101.76
195
.081
-8
8
10
- Acc
196
8.40 x
9.65 x 10-8
8
10
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.
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Cohen’s d
2.84

2.37

1.09

0.18

For channel 4,2 (BA 10; left anterior prefrontal cortex), there was a significant
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for the positive accuracy
condition (M = 4.22 x 10-7, SD = 9.55 x 10-8) and positive occurrence (M = 2.44 x 10-7,
SD = 6.42 x 10-8); t(195) = -45.49, p = .000; (d = 2.19). There was a significant difference
in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = 4.22-7, SD = 9.55
x 10-8) and negative occurrence (M = -2.08 x 10-7, SD = 2.59 x 10-7); t(195) = 41.17, p =
.000; (d = 3.23). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
concentration for positive occurrence (M = 2.44 x 10-7, SD = 6.42 x 10-8) and negative
accuracy (M = 2.90 x 10-8, SD =1.11 x 10-7); t(195) = 44.96, p = .000; (d = 2.37). There
was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for negative
occurrence (M = -2.08 x 10-7, SD = 2.59 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 2.90 x 10-8,
SD =1.11 x 10-7); t(195) = -17.36, p = .000; (d = 1.60). These findings are shown in Table
7.
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Table 7.
Channel 4,2 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about
accuracy and occurrence.

Pair 1

+ Acc

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
9.55 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

4.22 x
-45.49
195
-7
8
10
+ Occ
196
2.44 x
6.42 x 10-7
8
10
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
4.22 x
9.55 x 1041.96
195
.000**
-7
8
10
- Occ
196
-2.08 x
2.59 x 10-7
7
10
Pair 3
+ Occ
196
2.44 x
6.42 x 1044.96
195
.000**
-7
8
10
- Acc
196
2.90 x
1.11 x 10-8
7
10
Pair 4
- Occ
196
-2.08 x
2.59 x 10- -17.36
195
.000**
7
10-7
- Acc
196
2.90 x
1.11 x 107
10-8
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.

For channel 5,2 (BA 45; left inferior frontal gyrus opercularis), there was a
significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for the positive
accuracy condition (M = 7.94 x 10-7, SD = 1.78 x 10-7) and positive occurrence (M = 6.03
x 10-7, SD = 1.34 x 10-7); t(196) = -12.02, p = .000; (d = 1.43). There was a significant
difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for positive accuracy (M = 7.94 x
10-7, SD = 1.78 x 10-7) and negative occurrence (M = -1.81 x 10-7, SD = 1.70 x 10-7);
t(196) = 63.46, p = .000; (d = 5.60). There was a significant difference in the oxygenated
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Cohen’s d
2.19

3.23

2.37

1.60

hemoglobin concentration for positive occurrence (M = 6.03 x 10-7, SD = 1.34 x 10-7) and
negative accuracy (M = 5.75 x 10-7, SD =1.19 x 10-7); t(196) = 5.24, p = .000; (d = 0.29).
There was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for
negative occurrence (M = -1.81 x 10-7, SD = 1.70 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 5.75
x 10-7, SD = 1.19 x 10-7); t(195) = -57.83, p = .000; (d = 5.15). These findings are shown
in Table 8.

Table 8.
Channel 5,2 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing feedback about
accuracy and occurrence.

Pair 1

+ Acc

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
1.78 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

7.94 x
-12.02
195
-7
7
10
+ Occ
196
6.03 x
6.42 x 108
10-7
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
7.94 x
1.78 x 1063.46
195
.000**
-7
7
10
- Occ
196
-1.81 x
1.70 x 10-7
7
10
Pair 3
+ Occ
196
6.03 x
6.42 x 105.24
195
.000**
-7
8
10
- Acc
196
5.75 x
1.19 x 10-7
7
10
Pair 4
- Occ
196
-1.81 x
1.70 x 10- -57.83
195
.000**
-7
7
10
- Acc
196
5.75 x
1.19 x 10-7
7
10
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.
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Cohen’s d
1.43

5.60

0.29

5.15

Does Oxygenated Hemoglobin Concentration and Location Differ Between
Confirmatory and Disconfirmatory Feedback Conditions?
To address the second research question asking whether the level and location of
oxygenated hemoglobin in the confirmatory feedback conditions differs from the
disconfirmatory feedback conditions, Student’s paired-samples t-tests were conducted to
compare the peak beta coefficients across positive accuracy and negative accuracy
conditions, and positive occurrence and negative occurrence conditions. For channel 1,1,
there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration for
positive occurrence (M = 1.41 x 10-8, SD = 2.92 x 10-8) and negative occurrence (M =
3.47 x 10-7, SD = 1.43 x 10-7); t(195) = -31.18, p = .000; (d = 3.23). There was no
significant difference between positive accuracy (M = 1.68 x 10-7, SD = 1.25 x 10-7) and
negative accuracy (M = 1.85 x 10-7, SD = 6.82 x 10-8); t(195) = -1.57, p = .119; (d =
0.17).
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Table 9.
Channel 1,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs.
disconfirmatory social feedback.

Pair 1

+ Occ

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
2.92 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

1.41 x
-31.18
195
-8
8
10
- Occ
196
3.47 x
1.43 x 10-7
7
10
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
1.68 x
1.25 x 10-1.57
195
.119
-7
7
10
- Acc
196
1.85 x
6.82 x 10-7
8
10
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory

feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.

For channel 2,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
concentration for positive occurrence (M = 1.76 x 10-7, SD = 9.60 x 10-8) and negative
occurrence (M = 2.03 x 10-7, SD = 1.03 x 10-7); t(195) = -2.29, p = .023; (d = 0.27). There
was also a significant difference between positive accuracy (M = -1.15 x 10-8, SD = 8.50
x 10-8) and negative accuracy (M = 5.84 x 10-8, SD = 5.75 x 10-8); t(195) = -14.47, p =
.000; (d = 0.96). These findings are shown in Table 10.

65

Cohen’s d
3.23

0.17

Table 10.
Channel 2,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs.
disconfirmatory social feedback.

Pair 1

+ Occ

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
9.60 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.023*

1.76 x
-2.29
195
-7
8
10
- Occ
196
2.03 x
1.03 x 10-7
7
10
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
-1.15 x
8.50 x 10- -14.47
195
.000**
-8
8
10
- Acc
196
5.84 x
5.75 x 10-8
8
10
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.

For channel 3,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
concentration for positive occurrence (M = -2.45 x 10-7, SD = 1.10 x 10-7) and negative
occurrence (M = -5.54 x 10-8, SD = 4.83 x 10-8); t(195) = -22.36, p = .000; (d = 2.23).
There was also a significant difference between positive accuracy (M = -2.18 x 10-7, SD =
8.51 x 10-8) and negative accuracy (M = -2.50 x 10-7, SD = 8.88 x 10-8); t(195) = 3.58, p =
.000; (d = 0.37). These findings are shown in Table 11.
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0.27

0.96

Table 11.
Channel 3,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs.
disconfirmatory social feedback.

Pair 1

+ Occ

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
1.10 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

-2.45
-22.36
195
-7
7
x10
- Occ
196
-5.54 x
4.83 x 10-8
8
10
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
-2.18 x
8.51 x 103.58
195
.000**
-7
8
10
- Acc
196
-2.50 x
8.88 x 10-7
8
10
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.

For channel 4,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
concentration for positive occurrence (M = 5.86 x 10-9, SD = 1.16 x 10-7) and negative
occurrence (M = 9.99 x 10-8, SD = 8.04 x 10-8); t(195) = -10.14, p = .000; (d = 0.94).
There was also a significant difference between positive accuracy (M = 3.38 x 10-7, SD =
1.18 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 8.40 x 10-8, SD = 9.65 x 10-8); t(195) = 29.01, p
= .000; (d = 2.36). These findings are shown in Table 12.
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Cohen’s d
2.23

0.37

Table 12.
Channel 4,1 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs.
disconfirmatory social feedback.

Pair 1

+ Occ

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
1.16 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

5.86 x
-10.14
195
-9
7
10
- Occ
196
9.99 x
8.04 x 10-8
8
10
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
3.38 x
1.18 x 1029.01
195
.000**
-7
7
10
- Acc
196
8.40 x
9.65 x 10-8
8
10
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.

For channel 4,2, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
concentration for positive occurrence (M = 2.45 x 10-7, SD = 6.42 x 10-8) and negative
occurrence (M = -2.08 x 10-7, SD = 2.59 x 10-7); t(195) = 31.18, p = .000; (d = 0.94).
There was also a significant difference between positive accuracy (M = 4.22 x 10-7, SD =
9.55 x 10-9) and negative accuracy (M = 2.90 x 10-8, SD = 1.11 x 10-7); t(195) = 105.76, p
= .000; (d = 2.36). These findings are shown in Table 13.
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Cohen’s d
0.94

2.36

Table 13.
Channel 4,2 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs.
disconfirmatory social feedback.

Pair 1

+ Occ

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
1.16 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

5.86 x
-10.14
195
-9
7
10
- Occ
196
9.99 x
8.04 x 10-8
8
10
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
3.38 x
1.18 x 1029.01
195
.000**
-7
7
10
- Acc
196
8.40 x
9.65 x 10-8
8
10
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.

For channel 5,2, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
concentration for positive occurrence (M = 6.03 x 10-7, SD = 1.34 x 10-7) and negative
occurrence (M = -1.81 x 10-7, SD = 1.69 x 10-7); t(195) = 65.69, p = .000; (d = 5.14).
There was also a significant difference between positive accuracy (M = 7.94 x 10-7, SD =
1.78 x 10-7) and negative accuracy (M = 5.75 x 10-7, SD = 1.19 x 10-7); t(195) = 13.17, p
= .000; (d = 1.45). These findings are shown in Table 14.
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Cohen’s d
0.94

2.36

Table 14.
Channel 5,2 paired Student’s t-tests and Cohen’s d effect sizes for confirmatory vs.
disconfirmatory social feedback.

Pair 1

+ Occ

Sample
Size (n)
196

Mean

Std.
Deviation
1.34 x 10-

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

6.03 x
65.68
195
-7
7
10
- Occ
196
-1.81 x
1.69 x 10-7
7
10
Pair 2
+ Acc
196
7.94 x
1.78 x 1013.17
195
.000**
-7
7
10
- Acc
196
5.75 x
1.19 x 10-7
7
10
Abbreviations: + Acc = positive/confirmatory feedback about accuracy; + Occ =
positive/confirmatory feedback about occurrence; - Acc = negative/disconfirmatory
feedback about accuracy; - Occ = negative/disconfirmatory feedback about occurrence.

Analysis of Belief in Occurrence Behavioural Data
Belief in occurrence scores for the two rating items are presented in Table 15 and
Figure 10. There were no statistically significant differences between the pre-feedback
belief in occurrence ratings across the five within-subjects’ feedback conditions. Ratings
for control items significantly changed upon re-rating. Mean difference = .34 [95% CI,
.03, .65 ]; (d = .37).
When participants were given positive feedback about memory occurrence, belief
in occurrence scores increased by 0.34 points on the scale [95% CI, -.05, .73]; (d = .35).
When they were given positive feedback about memory accuracy, belief in occurrence
scores increased by 0.50 points on the scale [95% CI, .18, .82]; (d = .47). When they were
given negative feedback about memory occurrence, belief in occurrence scores decreased
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Cohen’s d
5.14

1.45

by 1.54 points on the scale [95% CI, -2.22, -.87]; (d = .80). When they were given
negative feedback about memory accuracy, belief in occurrence scores increased by 0.22
points [95% CI, -.04, .48]; (d = .20). Change scores for both belief in accuracy and belief
in occurrence are shown in Figure 11.
Table 15.
Pre- and post-social feedback belief in occurrence scores.
Type of Feedback

Average Belief in
Average Belief in
Average Change
Effect
Occurrence Scores Occurrence Scores
[95% CI]
Size
Before Feedback
After Feedback
(Cohen’s
[95% CI]
[95% CI]
d)
Control
6.29 [5.97-6.62]
6.63 [6.32-6.95]
.34* [.03, -.65]
.37
+ Occurrence
6.25 [5.91-6.59]
6.59 [6.24-6.93]
.34 [-.05, .73]
.35
+ Accuracy
6.21 [5.84-6.57]
6.71 [6.32-7.09]
.50* [.18, .82]
.47
- Occurrence
6.26 [5.83-6.70]
4.72 [3.86-5.58]
-1.54* [-2.22, -.87]
.80
- Accuracy
6.16 [5.79-6.54]
6.38 [6.01-6.76]
.22 [-.04, .48]
.20
Note. Feedback types are denoted by + (positive) or – (negative). Significance is bolded
and denoted by an asterisk (*).

Belief in Occurrence
7

Average Score

6
5
4
3
2
1
Control

(+) Occurrence

(+) Accuracy
Condition

Pre-Feedback

(-) Occurrence

(-) Accuracy

Post-Feedback

Figure 10. Graph depicting belief in occurrence average rating scores before and after
receiving each type of social feedback with 95% confidence intervals.
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Change Scores by Feedback Condition
1.5

Average Change Scores

1
0.5
0
-0.5

Average Change in Belief in
Accuracy Ratings

-1

Average Change in Belief in
Occurrence Ratings

-1.5
-2
-2.5

Control

Positive
Occurrence

Positive
Accuracy

Negative
Occurrence

Negative
Accuracy

Feedback Condition

Figure 11. Graph depicting belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy change scores
(post-feedback - pre-feedback) and 95% confidence intervals.

Analysis of Belief in Accuracy Behavioural Data
Belief in accuracy scores for the two rating items are presented in Table 16 and
Figure 12. There were no statistically significant differences between the pre-feedback
belief in accuracy ratings across the five within-subjects’ feedback conditions. Ratings
for control items significantly changed upon re-rating. Mean difference = .35 [95% CI,
.04, .67]; (d = .27).
When participants were given positive feedback about memory occurrence, belief
in accuracy scores increased by 0.24 points on the scale [95% CI, -.12, .60]; (d = .35).
When they were given positive feedback about memory accuracy, belief in accuracy
scores increased by 0.54 points on the scale [95% CI, .15, .94]; (d = .44). When they were
given negative feedback about memory occurrence, belief in accuracy scores decreased
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by 1.15 points on the scale [95% CI, -1.67, -.62]; (d = .63). When they were given
negative feedback about memory accuracy, belief in accuracy scores decreased by 0.75
points [95% CI, -1.20, -.29]; (d = .53). Change scores for both belief in accuracy and
belief in occurrence are shown in Figure 11.

Table 16.
Pre- and post-social feedback belief in accuracy scores.
Type of Feedback

Average Belief in
Accuracy Scores
Before Feedback

Average Belief
Average Change
Effect
in Accuracy
[95% CI]
Size
Scores After
(Cohen’s
Feedback
d)
Control
5.27 [4.77-5.75]
5.62 [5.21-6.03]
.35* [.04, .67]
.27
+ Occurrence
5.20 [4.73-5.68]
5.44 [4.97-5.92]
.24 [-.12, .60]
.17
+ Accuracy
5.32 [4.87-5.78]
5.86 [5.45-6.28]
.54* [.15, .94]
.44
- Occurrence
5.25 [4.68-5.82]
4.10 [3.40-4.80] -1.15* [-1.67, -.62]
.63
- Accuracy
5.15 [4.63-5.67]
4.40 [3.93-4.86] -.75* [-1.20, -.29]
.53
Note. Feedback types are denoted by + (positive) or – (negative). Significance is bolded
and denoted by an asterisk (*).
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Belief in Accuracy
7

Average Score

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Control

(+) Occurrence

(+) Accuracy
Condition

Pre-Feedback

(-) Occurrence

(-) Accuracy

Post-Feedback

Figure 12. Graph depicting belief in accuracy average rating scores before and after
receiving each type of social feedback with 95% confidence intervals.

Analysis of Relinquishment, Partial Relinquishment, and Non-Relinquishment of
Memory
Behavioural Analysis
All 17 participants were separated into relinquishment type categories: 6 were

categorized as relinquishers, 5 were categorized as non-relinquishers, and 6 were
categorized as partial relinquishers. Partial relinquishers were further sub-divided into
“relinquished belief in occurrence”, “relinquished belief in accuracy”, or “unclear
relinquishment of belief in accuracy” (see Table 17).
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Table 17.
Participant relinquishment types and sub-types

Relinquisher

Partial
Relinquisher

Non-Relinquisher

Number of
Participants
6

Participant
Codes
08.B2; 17.A1;
18.B1; 19.A2;
24.B2; 25.A1.

Partial Relinquisher
Sub-Type

Number of
Participants

Participant
Codes

6

06.B1; 14.B1;
16.B2; 20.B2;
21.A1; 22.B1.

Relinquished Belief
in Occurrence
Relinquished Belief
in Accuracy
Unclear
Relinquishment of
Belief in Accuracy

1

14.B1.

2

20.B2;
22.B1.
06.B1;
16.B2;
21.A1.

5

3

02.B1; 04.B2;
11.A2; 12.B2;
23.A2.

Table 18 denotes relinquishment type and response to each instance of social
challenge. In order to be placed into the “relinquisher” category, the participant had to
show a decrease from their pre-feedback score after every instance of disconfirmatory
social feedback across the four instances of negative feedback, with a decrease being
defined as a change of -0.5 points or more for this study. In order to be placed in the
“non-relinquisher” category, the participant had to show either no change or an increase
in their score after every instance of disconfirmatory social feedback on the four
instances of negative feedback.
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Table 18.
Breakdown of participant relinquishment type and instance of disconfirmatory social
feedback.
Participant

Occurrence
Challenge 1

Occurrence
Challenge 2

Accuracy
Challenge 1

Accuracy
Challenge 2

Relinquishment
Type

2.B1
4.B2
6.B1

No
No
Yes

No
No
Yes

No
No
Yes

No
No
No

8.B2
11.A2
12.B2
14.B1

Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
No
No
No

Yes
No
No
No

Non-Relinquisher
Non-Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
Non-Relinquisher
Non-Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher

16.B2

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

17.A1
18.B1
19.A2
20.B2

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

21.A1

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

22.B1

No

No

Yes

Yes

23.A2
24.B2
25.A1

No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher

If partial,
subtype?

Unclear Belief
in Accuracy

Relinquished
Belief in
Occurrence
Unclear Belief
in Accuracy

Relinquished
Belief in
Accuracy
Unclear Belief
in Accuracy
Relinquished
Belief in
Accuracy

Non-Relinquisher
Relinquisher
Relinquisher

Note. Each participant was challenged for their belief in their memory occurrence and
memory accuracy two times (as shown in columns 2-5). Average belief in occurrence and
belief in accuracy change scores were used to denote each participant as “yes” or “no” in
each row. Participants had to show at least a 0.5-point decrease on belief in accuracy
items when challenged about memory accuracy or at least a 0.5-point decrease on belief
in occurrence items when challenged about memory occurrence to be deemed as a
relinquisher. Non-relinquishers had to show no change across all instances of challenge.
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Partial relinquishers showed either relinquishment of only belief in accuracy and not
belief in occurrence (“relinquished belief in accuracy” subtype), relinquishment of belief
in occurrence and not belief in accuracy (“relinquished belief in occurrence” subtype), or
an unclear pattern of relinquishment, whereby they relinquished belief in accuracy on one
instance of challenge but not on the other (“unclear belief in accuracy” subtype).

Analysis of Exploratory fNIRS Findings
To address the exploratory portion of the second research question assessing
whether the level and location of oxygenated hemoglobin differs between participants
who relinquish their belief in their memory and participants who maintain their belief in
their memory, independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare the peak beta
coefficients across the three different relinquishment types: relinquisher, partial
relinquisher, and non-relinquisher. These differences are compared for both types of
disconfirmatory feedback (occurrence and accuracy), across each channel.
For channel 1,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback about the
occurrence of their memory and relinquished belief (M = 9.44 x 10-7, SD = 1.50 x 10-7)
and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 6.72 x 10-8, SD = 9.24 x 10-8);
t(390) = 69.58, p = .000; (d = 7.04). There was also a significant difference between those
who relinquished belief (M = 9.44 x 10-7, SD = 1.50 x 10-7) and did not relinquish belief
(M = -1.98 x 10-7, SD = 1.02 x 10-7); t(390) = 87.91, p = .000; (d = 8.90). Finally, there
was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished belief
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(M = 6.72 x 10-8, SD = 9.24 x 10-8) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = -1.98 x
10-7, SD = 1.02 x 10-7); t(390) = 26.88; (d = 2.73). These findings are shown in Table 19.
Table 19.
Channel 1,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory occurrence

Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher

Sample
Size (n)
196
196
196
196
196
196

Mean
9.44 x
10-7
6.72 x
10-8
9.44 x
10-7
-1.98 x
10-7
6.72 x
10-8
-1.98 x
10-7

Std.
Deviation
1.50 x 10-

390

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

Cohen’s
d
7.04

87.91

390

.000**

8.90

26.88

390

.000**

2.73

t

df

69.58

7

9.24 x 108

1.50 x 107

1.02 x 107

9.24 x 108

1.02 x 107

When looking at channel 1,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated
hemoglobin concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback
about the accuracy of their memory and relinquished belief (M = -5.36 x 10-8, SD = 3.98
x 10-8) and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 4.30 x 10-7, SD = 4.34 x 108

); t(390) = -115.06, p = .000; (d = 11.63). There was also a significant difference

between those who relinquished belief (M = -5.36 x 10-8, SD = 3.98 x 10-8) and did not
relinquish belief (M = 2.20 x 10-7, SD = 1.52 x 10-7); t(390) = -24.43, p = .000; (d = 2.46).
Finally, there was also a significant difference between participants who partially
relinquished belief (M = 4.30 x 10-7, SD = 4.34 x 10-8) and those who did not relinquish
belief (M = 2.20 x 10-7, SD = 1.52 x 10-7); t(390) = 18.61; (d = 1.88). These findings are
shown in Table 20.
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Table 20.
Channel 1,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory accuracy

Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher

Sample
Size (n)
196
196
196
196
196
196

Mean
-5.36 x
10-8
4.30 x
10-7
-5.36 x
10-8
2.20 x
10-7
4.30 x
10-7
2.20 x
10-7

Std.
Deviation
3.98 x 10-

390

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

Cohen’s
d
11.63

-24.43

390

.000**

2.46

18.61

390

.000**

1.88

t

df

-115.06

8

4.34 x 108

3.98 x 108

1.52 x 107

4.33 x 108

1.52 x 107

For channel 2,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback about the
occurrence of their memory and relinquished belief (M = 2.85 x 10-7, SD = 2.90 x 10-7)
and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = -1.49 x 10-6, SD = 1.19 x 10-7);
t(390) = 79.52, p = .000; (d = 6.02). There was also a significant difference between those
who relinquished belief (M = 2.85 x 10-7, SD = 2.90 x 10-7) and did not relinquish belief
(M = -2.08 x 10-7, SD = 1.05 x 10-7); t(390) = 22.34, p = .000; (d = 2.26). Finally, there
was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished belief
(M = -1.49 x 10-6, SD = 1.19 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = -2.08 x
10-7, SD = 1.05 x 10-7); t(390) = -114.02; (d = 7.50). These findings are shown in Table
21.
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Table 21.
Channel 2,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory occurrence

Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher

Sample
Size (n)
196
196
196
196
196
196

Mean
2.85 x
10-7
-1.49 x
10-6
2.85 x
10-7
-2.08 x
10-7
-1.49 x
10-6
-2.08 x
10-7

Std.
Deviation
2.90 x 10-

390

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

Cohen’s
d
6.02

22.34

390

.000**

2.26

-114.02

390

.000**

7.50

t

df

79.52

7

1.19 x 107

2.90 x 107

1.05 x 107

1.19 x 107

1.05 x 107

Also for channel 2,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated
hemoglobin concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback
about the accuracy of their memory and relinquished belief (M = 1.19 x 10-6, SD = 6.50 x
10-8) and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 5.45 x 10-7, SD = 1.09 x 10-7);
t(390) = 70.88, p = .000; (d = 7.19). There was also a significant difference between those
who relinquished belief (M = 1.19 x 10-6, SD = 6.50 x 10-8) and did not relinquish belief
(M = 1.44 x 10-8, SD = 1.55 x 10-7); t(390) = 97.79, p = .000; (d = 9.89). Finally, there
was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished belief
(M = 5.45 x 10-7, SD = 1.09 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = 1.44 x
10-8, SD = 1.55 x 10-7); t(390) = 39.16; (d = 3.96). These findings are shown in Table 22.
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Table 22.
Channel 2,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory accuracy

Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher

Sample
Size (n)
196
196
196
196
196
196

Mean
1.19 x
10-6
5.45 x
10-7
1.19 x
10-6
1.44 x
10-8
5.45 x
10-7
1.44 x
10-8

Std.
Deviation
6.50 x 10-

390

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

Cohen’s
d
7.19

97.79

390

.000**

9.89

39.16

390

.000**

3.96

t

df

70.88

8

1.09 x 107

6.50 x 108

1.55 x 107

1.09 x 107

1.55 x 107

For channel 3,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback about the
occurrence of their memory and relinquished belief (M = 1.26 x 10-7, SD = 6.95 x 10-8)
and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 4.69 x 10-8, SD = 1.03 x 10-7);
t(390) = 8.87, p = .000; (d = 0.90). There was also a significant difference between those
who relinquished belief (M = 1.26 x 10-7, SD = 6.95 x 10-8) and did not relinquish belief
(M = -2.24 x 10-7, SD = 3.38 x 10-8); t(390) = 63.42, p = .000; (d = 6.41). Finally, there
was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished belief
(M = 4.69 x 10-8, SD = 1.03 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = -2.24 x
10-7, SD = 3.38 x 10-8); t(390) = 35.03; (d = 3.53). These findings are shown in Table 23.
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Table 23.
Channel 3,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory occurrence

Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher

Sample
Size (n)
196
196
196
196
196
196

Mean
1.26 x
10-7
4.69 x
10-8
1.26 x
10-7
-2.24 x
10-7
4.70 x
10-8
-2.24 x
10-7

Std.
Deviation
6.95 x 10-

390

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

Cohen’s
d
0.9

63.42

390

.000**

6.41

35.03

390

.000**

3.53

t

df

8.87

8

1.03 x 107

6.95 x 108

3.38 x 108

1.03 x 107

3.38 x 108

Again, when looking at channel 3,1, there was a significant difference in the
oxygenated hemoglobin concentration between participants who received
disconfirmatory feedback about the accuracy of their memory and relinquished belief (M
= -1.69 x 10-7, SD = 1.76 x 10-7) and those who only partially relinquished belief (M =
2.27 x 10-7, SD = 8.15 x 10-8); t(390) = -28.68, p = .000; (d = 2.89). There was also a
significant difference between those who relinquished belief (M = -1.69 x 10-7, SD = 1.76
x 10-7) and did not relinquish belief (M = -1.34 x 10-8, SD = 1.59 x 10-7); t(390) = -9.21, p
= .000; (d = 0.93). Finally, there was also a significant difference between participants
who partially relinquished belief (M = 2.27 x 10-7, SD = 8.15 x 10-8) and those who did
not relinquish belief (M = -1.34 x 10-8, SD = 1.59 x 10-7); t(390) = 18.87; (d = 1.90).
These findings are shown in Table 24.
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Table 24.
Channel 3,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory accuracy

Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher

Sample
Size (n)
196
196
196
196
196
196

Mean
-1.69 x
10-7
2.27 x
10-7
-1.69 x
10-7
-1.34 x
10-8
2.27 x
10-7
-1.34 x
10-8

Std.
Deviation
1.76 x 10-

390

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

Cohen’s
d
2.89

-9.21

390

.000**

0.93

18.87

390

.000**

1.90

T

df

-28.68

7

8.15 x 108

1.76 x 107

1.59 x 107

8.15 x 108

1.59 x 107

For channel 4,1, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated hemoglobin
concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback about the
occurrence of their memory and relinquished belief (M = 2.91 x 10-7, SD = 2.90 x 10-7)
and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = -2.57 x 10-7, SD = 1.02 x 10-7);
t(390) = 24.99, p = .000; (d = 2.52). There was also a significant difference between those
who relinquished belief (M = 2.91 x 10-7, SD = 2.90 x 10-7) and did not relinquish belief
(M = -5.24 x 10-7, SD = 9.57 x 10-8); t(390) = 37.37, p = .000; (d = 3.78). Finally, there
was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished belief
(M = -2.57 x 10-7, SD = 1.02 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M = -5.24 x
10-7, SD = 9.57 x 10-8); t(390) = 26.68; (d = 2.71). These findings are shown in Table 25.
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Table 25.
Channel 4,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory occurrence

Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

Relinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher

Sample
Size (n)
196
196
196
196
196
196

Mean
2.91 x
10-7
-2.57 x
10-7
2.91 x
10-7
-5.24 x
10-7
-2.57 x
10-7
-5.24 x
10-7

Std.
Deviation
2.90 x 10-

390

Sig. (2tailed)
.000**

Cohen’s
d
2.52

37.37

390

.000**

3.78

26.68

390

.000**

2.71

t

df

24.99

7

1.02 x 107

2.90 x 107

9.57 x 108

1.01 x 107

9.56 x 108

Again, when looking at channel 4,1, there was a significant difference between
participants who partially relinquished belief (M = -9.71 x 10-8, SD = 1.01 x 10-7) and
those who did not relinquish belief (M = 3.78 x 10-8, SD = 2.02 x 10-7); t(390) = -8.37; (d
= 0.85). Unfortunately, due to poor signal quality, channel 4,1’s results were unavailable
for the “relinquisher” group. These findings are shown in Table 26.
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Table 26.
Channel 4,1 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory accuracy
Sample
Size (n)
-

Mean

-9.71 x
10-8
-

1.01 x 10-

3.78 x
10-8
-9.71 x
10-8
3.78 x
10-8

2.02 x 10-

Pair 1

Relinquisher

196

Pair 2

Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher

196

Pair 3

-

196
196

-

Std.
Deviation
-

t

df

-

-

Sig. (2tailed)
-

-

-

-

-8.37

390

.000**

7

7

1.01 x 107

2.02 x 107

For channel 4,2, there was no significant difference between participants who
partially relinquished belief when given disconfirmatory feedback about memory
occurrence (M = 2.69 x 10-7, SD = 3.07 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M
= 2.82 x 10-7, SD = 5.09 x 10-8); t(390) = -0.59; (d = 1.10). Unfortunately, due to poor
signal quality, channel 4,2’s results were unavailable for the “relinquisher” group. These
findings are shown in Table 27.
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Cohen’s
d

0.85

Table 27.
Channel 4,2 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory occurrence
Sample
Size (n)
-

Mean

2.69 x
10-7
-

3.07 x 10-

2.82 x
10-7
2.69 x
10-7
2.82 x
10-8

5.09 x 10-

Pair 1

Relinquisher

196

Pair 2

Partial
Relinquisher
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher
Partial
Relinquisher
NonRelinquisher

196

Pair 3

-

196
196

-

Std.
Deviation
-

t

df

-

-

Sig. (2tailed)
-

-

-

-

-.59

390

.553

7

8

3.07 x 107

5.09 x 108

Again, when looking at channel 4,2, there was a significant difference between
participants who partially relinquished belief when given disconfirmatory feedback about
memory accuracy (M = 1.47 x 10-8, SD = 1.47 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish
belief (M = 6.54 x 10-8, SD = 1.76 x 10-7); t(390) = -3.10, p = .002; (d = 0.31).
Unfortunately, due to poor signal quality, channel 4,2’s results were unavailable for the
“relinquisher” group. These findings are shown in Table 28.
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Cohen’s
d

1.10

Table 28.
Channel 4,2 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory accuracy
Sample
Size (n)

Mean

Std.
Deviation

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-3.10

390

.002*

Pair 1

Relinquisher -

-

-

1.47 x
10-8
-

1.47 x 10-

Pair 2

Partial
196
Relinquisher
Relinquisher Non196
Relinquisher
Partial
196
Relinquisher
Non196
Relinquisher

6.54 x
10-8
1.47 x
10-8
6.54 x
10-8

1.76 x 10-

Pair 3

Cohen’s
d

7

7

1.47 x 107

1.76 x 107

For channel 5,2, there was a significant difference between participants who
partially relinquished belief when given disconfirmatory feedback about memory
occurrence (M = -1.97 x 10-7, SD = 1.76 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief
(M = 1.89 x 10-7, SD = 7.02 x 10-8); t(390) = -28.56, p = .000; (d = 2.88). Unfortunately,
due to poor signal quality, channel 4,2’s results were unavailable for the “relinquisher”
group. These findings are shown in Table 29.
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0.31

Table 29.
Channel 5,2 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory occurrence
Mean

Std.
Deviation

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)

Cohen’s
d

Relinquisher -

-

-

-

-

-

-

Partial
196
Relinquisher

-1.97 x
10-7

1.76 x 10-

Relinquisher -

-

-

-

-

-

-

Non196
Relinquisher

1.89 x
10-7

7.02 x 10-

Partial
196
Relinquisher

-1.97 x
10-7

1.76 x 10-

-28.56

390

.000**

2.88

Non196
Relinquisher

1.89 x
10-7

7.01 x 10-

Sample
Size (n)
Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

7

8

7

8

When looking at channel 5,2, there was a significant difference in the oxygenated
hemoglobin concentration between participants who received disconfirmatory feedback
about the accuracy of their memory and relinquished belief (M = -9.15 x 10-7, SD = 2.02
x 10-7)and those who only partially relinquished belief (M = 1.17 x 10-6, SD = 1.47 x 107

); t(390) = -116.90, p = .000; (d = 11.80). There was a significant difference between

those who relinquished belief (M = -1.69 x 10-7, SD = 1.76 x 10-7) and did not relinquish
belief (M = 5.03 x 10-8, SD = 4.99 x 10-8); t(390) = -65.03, p = .000; (d = 6.56). Finally,
there was also a significant difference between participants who partially relinquished
belief (M = 1.17 x 10-6, SD = 1.47 x 10-7) and those who did not relinquish belief (M =
5.03 x 10-8, SD = 4.99 x 10-8); t(390) = 100.90, p = .000; (d = 10.20). These findings are
shown in Table 30.
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Table 30.
Channel 5,2 – Independent samples t-tests and Cohen’s d for deceptive feedback about
memory accuracy.
Mean

Std.
Deviation

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)

Cohen’s
d

-9.15 x
10-7

2.02 x 10-

-116.90

390

.000**

11.80

Partial
196
Relinquisher

1.17 x
10-6

1.47 x 10-

Relinquisher 196

-9.15 x
10-7

2.02 x 10-

-65.03

390

.000**

6.56

Non196
Relinquisher

5.03 x
10-8

4.99 x 10-

Partial
196
Relinquisher

1.17 x
10-6

1.47 x 10-

100.90

390

.000**

10.20

Non196
Relinquisher

5.03 x
10-8

4.99 x 10-

Sample
Size (n)
Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

Relinquisher 196

7

7

7

8

7

8

Using AtlasViewer GUI (Aasted et al., 2015), activation maps were generated
using oxy-hemoglobin (HbO) concentration data from between 5-10 seconds of the
hemodynamic response function (HRF). Figure 13 and 14 represent participants who
were deemed to be “relinquishers”, Figure 15 and 16 represent participants who were
deemed to be “partial-relinquishers”, and Figure 17 and 18 represent participants who
were deemed to be “non-relinquishers”.
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Figure 13. Participants denoted as “Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory feedback
about memory occurrence.
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Figure 14. Participants denoted as “Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory feedback
about memory accuracy.
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Figure 15. Participants denoted as “Partial Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory
feedback about memory occurrence.
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Figure 16. Participants denoted as “Partial Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory
feedback about memory accuracy.
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Figure 17. Participants denoted as “Non-Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory
feedback about memory occurrence.
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Figure 18. Participants denoted as “Non-Relinquishers” when given disconfirmatory
feedback about memory accuracy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Discussion
Summary of Major Findings
The current study aimed to investigate the neurocognitive mechanisms that
contribute to one’s metamemorial appraisals of their memory accuracy and memory
occurrence using a functional neuroimaging device. Past research has shown that despite
being rated highly synonymously in laboratory settings, certain forms of questioning can
create a dissociation of one’s belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence appraisals,
suggesting that they may in fact be distinct processes (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal,
2015; Korcsog, 2017; Korcsog, 2018; Korcsog et al. In Preparation). In other words, it
has been shown that one can believe that their memory occurred without thinking their
recollection is accurate, and one can believe that their memory is accurate, even if they
no longer believe it to have occurred. Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) is
commonly utilized in studies investigating the cognitive underpinnings of human
behaviour, largely because it maintains more ecological validity than other neuroimaging
modalities (Pinti et al., 2018). Because of this, fNIRS was utilized within this study to
measure participants’ brain activity when receiving different types of social feedback
about their memory.
The first research question addressed whether one’s appraisals of their memory
occurrence differs from their appraisals of their memory accuracy when given
confirmatory or disconfirmatory social feedback from an examiner. As demonstrated by
Scoboria, Talarico and Pascal (2015), Korcsog (2017), Korcsog (2018), and Korcsog et
al. (2020), one’s ratings of belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence can differ
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dependent upon the type of feedback given. In the current study, belief in accuracy and
belief in occurrence ratings dissociated when participants received disconfirmatory social
feedback about memory accuracy, thus replicating the findings of Korcsog et al. (In
Preparation). When looking at the functional neuroimaging findings, we see that there is
a significant difference in neuronal activation across almost the entire left prefrontal
cortical array (BA 8, 9, 10, and 45) when comparing all types of feedback about memory
occurrence and memory accuracy. This suggests that the neurocognitive mechanisms at
play are quite different when comparing one’s appraisal of how accurate their memory is
versus whether or not that memory occurred, regardless of whether or not that memory is
deemed to be accurate or inaccurate by another person.
More specifically, when comparing the brain activity associated with one’s
appraisals of memory accuracy and memory occurrence qualitatively, we can see
differential patterns of activation across the AtlasViewer GUI-generated activation maps
(Figure 19). When participants were presented with feedback about their memory
occurrence, there seems to be increased activation in the vicinity of the inferior frontal
gyrus (BA 45; channel 5,2), whereas feedback about memory accuracy seemed to differ
based upon whether the feedback was confirmatory or disconfirmatory. Disconfirmatory
social feedback about memory accuracy showed a relative increase in activity in the
inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45; channel 5,2), much like feedback about memory
occurrence did. On the other hand, confirmatory social feedback about memory accuracy
demonstrated increased activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (BA 8; channel 1,1).
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Figure 19. A comprehensive summary of the brain activity associated with each of the
five feedback conditions, mapped onto a 3D brain model using AtlasViewer GUI.

The second research question aimed to further investigate the distinction between
confirmatory and disconfirmatory social feedback. When participants received

98

confirmatory social feedback about the occurrence of a scene, their ratings of their
memory accuracy and memory occurrence stayed largely the same as before they
received feedback, likely due to the ceiling effects of already having rated their memory
as being accurate and having occurred on the 7-point Likert-type scale. When participants
received confirmatory feedback about their memory accuracy however, there was an
increase in both belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence ratings, largely due to the fact
that telling someone that they remembered the details of a scene accurately would
confirm that the scene did in fact occur. Alternatively, when participants were given
disconfirmatory feedback about their memory’s occurrence or accuracy, a decisionmaking process would presumably come into play. When participants were given
disconfirmatory feedback about the occurrence of their memory, both their belief in
accuracy and belief in occurrence ratings significantly decreased on average. When given
disconfirmatory feedback about memory accuracy, belief in accuracy ratings significantly
decreased however belief in occurrence ratings did not change. Again, this is presumably
due to the fact that telling someone that “they got less than 50% of the details correct”
would confirm that a scene was in fact presented. However, it is notable that
confirmatory feedback about memory accuracy actually increased belief in occurrence
ratings, whereas confirmatory feedback about memory accuracy did not cause a
significant change from pre-feedback scores.
When looking at the fNIRS findings comparing confirmatory feedback about
memory occurrence to disconfirmatory feedback about memory occurrence, we see a
difference in activation across nearly all of the channels. As well, when comparing
confirmatory feedback about memory accuracy to disconfirmatory feedback about
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memory accuracy, there is a statistical difference across nearly all of the channels. It is
notable however, that channel 1,1 (BA 8; medial prefrontal cortex) did not show a
difference between confirmatory and disconfirmatory feedback about accuracy, and there
were small effect sizes for channels 2,1 (BA 9; dorsolateral/anterior prefrontal cortex)
and 3,1 (BA 9; dorsolateral/anterior prefrontal cortex) when comparing confirmatory and
disconfirmatory feedback about accuracy. As shown in Figure 19, the 3D-generated
activation maps seem to show a higher concentration of oxygenated hemoglobin when
participants are presented with disconfirmatory feedback about memory occurrence than
when given confirmatory feedback about memory occurrence across the inferior frontal
gyrus. As well, when participants were given disconfirmatory social feedback about
memory accuracy, activation was greater across the inferior frontal gyrus when compared
to confirmatory feedback about memory accuracy. Although the inferior frontal gyrus is
largely known for its involvement in language processing and speech production, it is
also thought to play a role in elaborate attentional and working memory processing such
as fast and accurate responding and the elaborate processing required to increase
accuracy (Tops & Boksem, 2011).Because of the variability in relinquishment patterns
seen when participants received disconfirmatory social feedback in general, and in further
exploration of the second research question, participants were separated into
threecategories based upon their change in rating scale scores (full relinquishers, partial
relinquishers, and non-relinquishers).
The level and location of activation largely differed between relinquishers, partial
relinquishers, and non-relinquishers, both when given disconfirmatory feedback about
memory occurrence and memory accuracy. It is notable that Cohen’s d effect sizes are
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very large, suggesting that there is a substantial difference in activation patterns between
groups. Channel 4,2 (BA 10; anterior prefrontal cortex) was the only channel that did not
show a significant difference between partial relinquishers and non-relinquishers when
given disconfirmatory feedback about memory occurrence. However, this region showed
a medium effect size when given disconfirmatory feedback about memory accuracy.
Because there was significant variability within the “partial relinquishers” category
across how they relinquished (i.e., whether they relinquished only belief in occurrence,
only belief in accuracy, or if it was an unclear relinquishment pattern), results comparing
this category to “relinquishers” or “non-relinquishers” should be taken with caution. A
recent study by Pinti et al. (2020) explored the role of the prefrontal cortex (BA 10) in
face-to-face deception using fNIRS, and found that during situations involving close
personal interactions, the anterior prefrontal cortex was involved in the processing of
deception. These findings differ from the current study’s findings, as we tend to see less
activation in the left anterior prefrontal cortex and more activation in the inferior frontal
gyrus during the deceptive conditions. However, Pinti et al. (2020) used a much different
deception paradigm, whereby the participants knew the task would involve lying and lie
detection, rather than the current study’s paradigm of being naïve to the deceptive
component.
Limitations
The aim of the current study was to investigate the underlying neurocognitive
mechanisms that contribute to one’s appraisals of their memory. While this task was
accomplished by comparing the oxygenated hemoglobin concentration in several left
prefrontal cortical regions for different types of social feedback (feedback about accuracy
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vs. feedback about occurrence; confirmatory feedback vs. disconfirmatory feedback),
limitations to the study should be highlighted. First, with regards to the study design, it is
pertinent to discuss whether watching or listening to a scene of an actress performing
simple tasks and then receiving social feedback is demonstrative of social feedback for
one’s own autobiographical memory. While it is true that the act of a participant
watching or listening to a scene and then remembering themselves being exposed to that
scene is technically an autobiographical memory, targeting one’s own personal memories
or even scenes recorded in the first person would arguably be much more demonstrative
of the cognitive processes attributed to true autobiographical memory due to the addition
of an emotional and self-relevant component.
Further, another methodological limitation can be seen in the wording of the
feedback given regarding memory accuracy. Telling someone that they remembered less
than 50% of the details correctly leaves room for multiple interpretations such as “I
remembered approximately half of the scene correctly” or “I remembered very little of
the scene correctly”. As well, providing this kind of feedback about memory accuracy
solidifies that the scene in question did in fact occur, thus influencing belief in occurrence
ratings. Following this, the “feedback” portion of the study took place in a small, dark
room where the participant’s brain activity was being recorded by the fNIRS machine,
and there were long delays between instruction to ensure that the machine was recording
the entirety of the hemodynamic response. It is possible that participants could have been
clued-in to the fact that the researchers were more interested in this portion of the study,
thus allowing for the deceptive component to be spoiled. This adds another limitation
which is that because of the sample size after removing participants due to poor signal
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strength, participants who guessed the purpose of the study when asked “what do you
think we are studying today?” were not removed. However, this limitation is largely
remedied by the exploratory portion of the study which separated participants based upon
relinquishment type, as those participants who knew they were being deceived were
either placed in the partial or non-relinquishment categories. This also draws upon the
limitation of the small sample size, which did not allow for a comparison of the “partial
relinquisher” sub-categories. Although the proposed sample size was met, it is
recommended that future studies collect a larger sample to account for signal detection
problems and individual differences in relinquishment pattern.
Apart from methodological limitations, fNIRS-specific limitations are also
pertinent to this discussion. In addition to the limitations of fNIRS outlined in the
introduction of this thesis, there were study-specific fNIRS limitations for this research
project. First, as mentioned, the nature of an fNIRS-based study lends itself to potentially
upsetting research with a deceptive component, adding an obvious indication that
something important is occurring during the time of recording.
As mentioned by Pinti et al. (2019), the pre-processing pipeline across fNIRS
studies is currently heterogeneous, meaning that the different filtering and functional
techniques used can drastically affect the data before performing statistical analyses. This
increases the probability of problems in the replicability of the study, especially when the
different systems, the different software, and the different researchers at differing levels
of expertise are factored in (Pfiefer et al., 2018). As well, due to the highly correlated
nature of fNIRS noise data (Huppert, 2016), statistical assumptions are often violated.
This problem is remediated by use of a GLM framework for statistical analysis, however
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it is also up to the researcher whether or not to use the mean HRF beta coefficients
produced by the linear regression analysis, or the “peak” beta coefficients produced by
the linear regression analysis (as used in this study). The researcher’s choice of which of
the two to use can result in completely different findings.
Lastly, the use of the 10/20 system in the absence of digitizing procedures reduces
the precision with which determinations about cortical location can be made. The 10/20
system has been regarded to be a tedious and error-prone procedure that involves both the
manual measurement and marking of 10/20 landmarks on the head of the participant, thus
making it difficult for the researcher to maintain high reliability. To address these issues,
semi-automatic approaches should be used in the future, such as Xiao et al. (2017)’s
proposed method. Consequently, we refrained from drawing strong conclusions about the
neural representation of these processes.
Future Directions
Following the aforementioned limitations to this study, there are a few avenues
pertinent for exploration in the future. First and foremost, these findings should be
replicated in order to solidify the findings as reliable and valid. It would also be pertinent
to increase the sample size in order to be able to parse out the difference in activation
patterns of the “partial relinquishers” sub-groups.
To address the limitation of the study’s scenes not reflecting one’s own personal
autobiographical memories, it would be interesting to conduct a study using virtual
reality scenes filmed in the first-person in order to mimic the act of doing each of the
tasks. This way, it would seem as though the participant themselves were performing
each task, creating more personal relevance to the memory. Alternatively, obtaining
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personal memories from participants’ family members could be another method, however
it would be much more difficult to do-so given that they would have to be unaware of this
exchange.
To address the limitation of the sterility of the fNIRS testing environment, it may
be helpful to set up the fNIRS at the beginning of session two rather than only during the
“feedback phase”. This way the entire session is deemed as being important to the study
in the participant’s mind, making it less obvious as to what the ultimate purpose is, and
potentially maintaining the deceptive component of the study.
Implications
This line of research has increasingly strengthened the field’s understanding of
the distinct underlying cognitive mechanisms contributing to memory reports. By better
understanding the micro-components of one’s appraisals of their memory, we can more
accurately capture and understand the overall implications on areas that rely heavily on
memory reports such as judicial decision making, psychotherapy, and forensic
interviewing. Contemporary discussions of social influences on remembering (Echterhoff
& Hirst, 2009) can thus be enriched by considering what types of social feedback can
influence the development and revision of event occurrence versus the sharing/editing
/revision of memory for event details (see Brown et al., 2015; Foley, 2015; Scoboria,
Nash & Mazzoni, 2017; and Sheen, Kemp & Rubin, 2001 for interesting examples).
Conclusion
This study was the first to investigate the neurocognitive underpinnings of one’s
memory appraisals when receiving different types of social feedback, and thus paves the
way for the continued use of functional neuroimaging in this line of research. Left
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prefrontal cortical activation patterns differed when participants were given social
feedback about their memory accuracy and memory occurrence for simple scenes
presented in a laboratory setting. As well, this activation differed based upon whether or
not the social feedback was confirmatory or disconfirmatory/deceptive. It was also found
that brain activity differed dependent on participants’ decision to maintain, relinquish, or
partially relinquish belief in their memory. This suggests that based upon one’s pattern of
brain activity when receiving social feedback, whether or not they are going to relinquish
or maintain their memory could be estimated. Further, despite being rated highly
synonymously in the literature and thus largely “lumped together” as one (Scoboria,
Talarcio, & Pascal, 2015), findings demonstrating that belief in accuracy and belief in
occurrence can be dissociated (Korcsog, 2017; Korcsog, 2018; Korcsog et al. 2020) are
strengthened by this research, which concludes that belief in accuracy and belief in
occurrence are neurologically distinct metamemorial appraisals and that decision-making
about memory involves complex neurological processes.

106

REFERENCES
Aasted, C. M., Yücel, M. A., Cooper, R. J., Petkov, M. P., Boas, D. A., Cooper, R. J.,
Dubb, J., & Tsuzuki, D. (2015). Anatomical guidance for functional near-infrared
spectroscopy: AtlasViewer tutorial. Neurophoton, 2(2),
doi:10.1117/1.NPh.2.2.020801
Addis, D.R., McIntosh, A.R., Moscovitch, M., Crawley, A.P., & McAndrews, M.P.
(2004). Characterizing spatial and temporal features of autobiographical memory
retrieval networks: a partial least squares approach. NeuroImage, 23, 1460-1471.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.08.007
Arenth, P., Ricker, J., & Schultheis, M. (2007). Applications of functional near-infrared
spectroscopy fNIRS to neurorehabilitation of cognitive disabilities. Clinical
Neuropsychology, 21(1), 38–57.
Bakker, A., Smith, B., Ainslie, P., & Smith, K. (2012). Near-infrared spectroscopy.
Applied Aspects of Ultrasonography in Humans. InTech Open Access Publisher.
Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Bartocci, M., Winberg, J., Ruggiero, C., Bergqvist, L., Serra, G., & Lagercrantz, H.
(2000). Activation of olfactory cortex in newborn infants after odor stimulation: a
functional near-infrared spectroscopy study. Pediatric Research, 48 (1), 18–23.
Bauernfeind, G., Wriessnegger, S. C., Daly, I., & Müller-Putz, G. R. (2014). Separating
heart and brain: On the reduction of physiological noise from multichannel
functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) signals. Journal of Neural
Engineering. https://doi.org/10.1088/1741-2560/11/5/056010

107

Bayley, P. J., Hopkins, R.O., & Squire, L.R. (2006). The fate of old memories after
medial temporal lobe damage. Journal of Neuroscience, 26(51), 13311–13317.
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4262-06.2006
Blamire, A.M., Ogawa, S., Ugurbil, K., Rothman, D., McCarthy, G., Ellermann, J.M.,
Hyder, F., Rattner, Z., Shulman, R.G. (1992). Dynamic mapping of the human
visual cortex by high-speed magnetic resonance imaging. PNAS, 89(22), 1106911073. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.89.22.11069
Boas, D. A., Elwell, C. E., Ferrari, M., & Taga, G. (2014). Twenty years of functional
near-infrared spectroscopy: Introduction for the special issue. NeuroImage, 85, 1–
5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.11.033
Brazy, J.E., Lewis, D.V., Mitnick, M.H., Jöbsis van der Vliet, F.F. (1985). Noninvasive
monitoring of cerebral oxygenation in preterm infants: preliminary observations.
Pediatrics, 75(2), 217-225.
Brewer, D. D. (1995). The social structural basis of the organization of persons in
memory. Human Nature, 6(4), 379–403. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02734207
Brewer, W. F. (1986). What is autobiographical memory? In D. C. Rubin
(Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 25-49). New York, NY, US: Cambridge
University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558313.006
Brigadoi, S., Ceccherini, L., Cutini, S., Scarpa, F., Scatturin, P., Selb, J., … Cooper, R. J.
(2014). Motion artifacts in functional near-infrared spectroscopy: A comparison
of motion correction techniques applied to real cognitive data. NeuroImage, 85,
181–191. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.04.082

108

Bunce, S.C., Izzetoglu, M., Izzetoglu, K., Onaral, B., Pourrezaei, K. (2006). Functional
near-infrared spectroscopy. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers:
Engineering in Medicine and Biology Magazine, 25(4), 54-62. doi:
10.1109/MEMB.2006.1657788
Ceci, S. J., & Bruck, M. (1993). Suggestibility of the child witness: A historical review
and synthesis. Psychological Bulletin, 113(3), 403-439.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.113.3.403
Cohen-Adad, J., Chapuisat, S., Doyon, J., Rossignol, S., Lina, J. M., Benali, H., et al.
(2007). Activation detection in diffuse optical imaging by means of the general
linear model. Medical Image Analysis. 11, 616–629. doi:
10.1016/j.media.2007.06.002
Conway, M.A., Turk, D.J., Miller, S.L., Logan, J., Nebes, R.D., Meltzer, C.C., Becker,
J.T. (1999). A Positron Emission Tomography (PET) study of autobiographical
memory retrieval. Memory, 7(5-6), 679-703. doi: 10.1080/096582199387805
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, Christopher, W. (2000). The construction of
autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review,
107(2), 261–288. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.107.2.261
Cope, M., & Delpy, D. (1988). System for long-term measurement of cerebral blood and
tissue oxygenation on newborn infants by near infra-red transillumination.
Medical & Biological Engineering & Computing, 26(3), 289-294.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02447083
Cumming, G. (2014). The new statistics: Why and how. Psychological Science, 25(1),
7–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613504966

109

Crovitz, H. F. (1986). Loss and recovery of autobiographical memory after head injury.
In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 273-290). New York, NY,
US: Cambridge University Press.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558313.022
D’Argembeau, A., Feyers, D., Majerus, S., Collette, F., Van der Linden, M., Maquet, P.,
& Salmon, E. (2008). Self-reflection across time: Cortical midline structures
differentiate between present and past selves. Social Cognitive and Affective
Neuroscience, 3(3), 244–252. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsn020
Davis, D., & Loftus, E. F. (2005). Age and functioning in the legal system: Victims,
witnesses and Jurors. In Y. I. Noy & W. Karwowski (Eds.), Handbook of human
factors in litigation (pp. 11-1 to 11-53). New York, NY: CRC Press
Delpy, D. T., & Cope, M. (1997). Quantification in tissue near-infrared spectroscopy.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
352(1354), 649–659. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1997.0046
Echterhoff, G., & Hirst, W. (2009). Social influence on memory. Social Psychology,
40(3), 106-110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335.40.3.106
Elwell, C. E., Springett, R., Hillman, E., and Delpy, D. T. (1999). Oscillations in cerebral
haemodynamics. Implications for functional activation studies. Advances in
Experimental Medicine and Biology. 471, 57–65.
Fantini, S. (2014). Dynamic model for the tissue concentration and oxygen saturation of
hemoglobin in relation to blood volume, flow velocity, and oxygen consumption:
Implications for functional neuroimaging and coherent hemodynamics

110

spectroscopy (CHS). NeuroImage, 85, 202–221.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.03.065
Ferrari, M., Ferrari, M., & Quaresima, V. (2007). Progress of near-infrared spectroscopy
and topography for brain and muscle clinical applications. Journal of Biomedical
Optics, 12(6), 062104. https://doi.org/10.1117/1.2804899
Ferrari, M., & Quaresima, V. (2012). A brief review on the history of human functional
near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) development and fields of application.
NeuroImage, 63(2), 921-935. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.03.049.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance.: Stanford University Press.
Friston, K. J. (1994). Functional and effective connectivity in neuroimaging: A synthesis.
Human Brain Mapping, 2(1–2), 56–78. Retrieved from
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hbm.460020107
Friston, K., Ashburner, J., Kiebel, S., Nichols, T., & Penny, W. (2011). Statistical
Parametric Mapping: The Analysis of Functional Brain Images. London, UK:
Academic Press.
Gabbert, F., Memon, A., & Wright, D. B. (2006). Memory conformity: Disentangling the
steps towards influence during a discussion. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
13(3), 480-485. doi: 10.3758/BF03193873
Gagnon, L., Perdue, K., Greve, D. N., Goldenholz, D., Kaskhedikar, G., and Boas, D. A.
(2011). Improved recovery of the hemodynamic response in diffuse optical
imaging using short optode separations and state-space modeling. Neuroimage,
56, 1362–1371. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.03.001

111

Gagnon, L, Yücel, M.A., Boas, D.A., & Cooper, R.J. (2014). Further improvement in
reducing superficial contamination in NIRS using double short separation
measurements. Neuroimage. 85, 127-135. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.01.073.
Germon, T., Kane, N., Manara, A., Nelson, R. (1994). Near-infrared spectroscopy in
adults: effects of extracranial ischaemia and intracranial hypoxia on estimation of
cerebral oxygenation. British Journal of Anaesthesiology, 73(4), 503-506.
Goel, V., & Dolan, R. J. (2004). Differential involvement of left prefrontal cortex in
inductive and deductive reasoning. Cognition, 93(3).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2004.03.001
Greenberg, D.L., & Rubin, D.C. (2003). The neuropsychology of autobiographical
memory. Cortex, 39(4-5), 687-728. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70860-8
Greenberg, D. L., Rice, H. J., Cooper, J. J., Cabeza, R., Rubin, D. C., & LaBar, K. S.
(2005). Co-activation of the amygdala, hippocampus and inferior frontal gyrus
during autobiographical memory retrieval. Neuropsychologia, 43(5), 659–674.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.09.002
Gregg, N. M., White, B. R., Zeff, B. W., Berger, A. J., and Culver, J. P. (2010). Brain
specificity of diffuse optical imaging: improvements from superficial signal
regression and tomography. Frontiers of Neuroenergetics, 2(14). doi:
10.3389/fnene.2010.00014
Gudjonsson, G.H. (2003). The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A
Handbook. Southern Gate, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

112

Hocke, L.M., Duszynski, C.C., Debert, C.T., Dleikan, D., & Dunn, J.F. (2018). Reduced
functional connectivity in adults with persistent post-concussion symptoms: A
Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy study. Journal of Neurotrauma, 35(11).
http://doi.org/10.1089/neu.2017.5365
Holland, A. C., & Kensinger, E. A. (2010). Emotion and autobiographical memory.
Physics of Life Reviews, 7(1), 88–131. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2010.01.006
Hoshi, Y., & Tamura, M. (1993). Detection of dynamic changes in cerebral oxygenation
coupled to neuronal function during mental work in man. Neuroscience Letters.
150(1), 5-8. doi: 10.1016/0304-3940(93)90094-2
Hoshi, Y., Tsou, B., Billock, V., Tanosaki, M., Iguchi, Y., Shimada, M., Shinba, T.,
Yamada, Y., & Oda, I. (2003). Spatiotemporal characteristics of hemodynamic
changes in the human lateral prefrontal cortex during working memory tasks.
Neuroimage, 20(3), 1493–1504.
Huppert, T. J., Diamond, S. G., Franceschini, M. A., & Boas, D. A. (2009). HomER: a
review of time-series analysis methods for near-infrared spectroscopy of the
brain. Applied Optics, 48(10), D280-D298
Huppert, T. J. (2016). Commentary on the statistical properties of noise and its
implication on general linear models in functional near-infrared spectroscopy.
Neurophotonics, 3(1), 010401. https://doi.org/10.1117/1.nph.3.1.010401
Hyman, I.E. (1999). Creating false autobiographical memories: Why people believe their
memory errors. In E. Winograd, R. Fivush, W. Hirst (Eds.), Ecological
Approaches to Cognition: Essays in Honor of Ulric Neisser (pp. 229-248).
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.

113

Hyman, I.E., Husband, T., & Billings, F. (1995). False memories of childhood
experiences. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 9(3), 181–197.
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.2350090302
ISS Medical (2016). Technical note. Retrieved from ISS website:
http://www.iss.com/biomedical/instruments/imagent.html
Jacobsen, C. F. (1936). Studies of cerebral function in primates. I. The functions of the
frontal association areas in monkeys. Comparative Psychology Monographs, (13)
3, 1-60.
Jahani, S., Fantana, A. L., Harper, D., Ellison, J. M., Boas, D. A., Forester, B. P., &
Yücel, M. A. (2017). FNIRS can robustly measure brain activity during memory
encoding and retrieval in healthy subjects. Scientific Reports, 7(1), 1–14.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-09868-w
Karpel, M. E., Hoyer, W. J., Toglia, M. P. (2001). Accuracy and qualities of real and
suggested memories: Nonspecific age differences. Journal of Gerontology, Series
B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 56(2), 103-110. doi:
10.1093/geronb/56.2.p103
Kopelman, M. D., & Kapur, N. (2001). The loss of episodic memories in retrograde
amnesia: Single-case and group studies. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B: Biological Sciences, 356(1413), 1409–1421.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2001.0942
Korcsog, K.H. (2017). Feedback about source and quality of recall uniquely impact
occurrence and accuracy appraisals for remembered events. Unpublished
Manuscript.

114

Korcsog, K.H. (2018). Providing negative feedback about the accuracy of details within
scenes reduces appraisals of memory accuracy but does not affect appraisals of
memory occurrence. Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 7533.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/7533
Korcsog, K. H., Scoboria, A., Turcas, N., Mazzoni, G., Otgaar, H., & Abeare, C. (In
Preparation). Disconfirmatory social feedback about memory for actions
performed in the lab elicits cognitive dissonance. Manuscript in Preparation.
Korcsog, K. H., Scoboria, A., & Mazzoni, G. (In Preparation). Experimentally
distinguishing belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy for recorded scenes.
Manuscript in Preparation.
Locke, D. (1971). Personal memory. In: Memory. Problems of Philosophy. Palgrave,
London.
Loftus, E. F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology,
7(4), 560-572, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(75)90023-7
Loftus, E. F. (2005). Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation
of the malleability of memory. Learning and Memory. 12, 361-366, doi:
10.1101/lm.94705
Loftus, E. F., & Hoffman, H. G. (1989). Misinformation and memory: The creation of
new memories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 118(1), 100-104.
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.118.1.100
Loftus, E. F., Levidow, B., & Duensing, S. (1992). Who remembers best? Individual
differences in memory for events that occurred in a science museum. Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 6(2), 93-107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.2350060202

115

Loftus, E. F., Miller, D. G., and Burns, H. J. (1978). Semantic integration of verbal
information into a visual memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Learning and Memory, 4(1), 19-31, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/02787393.4.1.19
Loftus, E. F., & Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An
example of the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behaviour, 13(5), 585-589. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S00225371(74)80011-3
Matz, D. C., & Wood, W. (2005). Cognitive Dissonance in Groups: The Consequences of
Disagreement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88(1), 22-37.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.1.22
Mazzoni, G., Scoboria, A., & Harvey, L. (2010). Nonbelieved memories. Psychological
Science, 21(9), 1334-1340. doi: 10.1177/0956797610379865
Merckelbach, H., Van Roermund, H., & Candel, I. (2006). Effects of collaborative recall:
Denying true information is as powerful as suggesting misinformation.
Psychology, Crime & Law, 13(6), 573-581. doi:10.1080/10683160601160679
Miller, E.K., & Cohen, J.D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function.
Annual Review of Neuroscience, 24, 167-202. doi:
10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.167
Milner, B., & Petrides, M. (1984). Behavioural effects of frontal-lobe lesions in
man. Trends in Neurosciences, 7(11), 403-407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S01662236(84)80143-5

116

Moscovitch, M., Cabeza, R., Winocur, G., & Nadel, L. (2016). Episodic memory and
beyond: The hippocampus and neocortex in transformation. Annual Review of
Psychology, 67, 105-134. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143733
Munsat, S. (1967). The Concept of Memory. New York, NY: Random House.
Murata, Y., Sakatani, K., Katayama, Y., Fukaya, C. (2002). Increase in focal concetration
of deoxyhaemoglobin during neuronal activity in cerebral ischaemic patients. The
British Medical Journal, 73(2), 182.
Nairne, J. S., & Pandeirada, J. N. S. (2016). Adaptive memory: The evolutionary
significance of survival processing. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11(4),
496–511. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691616635613
Neisser, U. (1996). Remembering the earthquake: Direct experience vs. hearing the news.
Memory, 11(4), 337-358. doi: 10.1080/096582196388898
Noah, J. A., Ono, Y., Nomoto, Y., Shimada, S., Tachibana, A., Zhang, X., … Hirsch, J.
(2015). fMRI Validation of fNIRS Measurements During a Naturalistic Task.
Journal of Visualized Experiments : JoVE, (100), e52116.
https://doi.org/10.3791/52116
Okado, Y., & Stark, C. E. L. (2005). Neural activity during encoding predicts false
memories created by misinformation. Learning and Memory, 12(1), 3–11.
https://doi.org/10.1101/lm.87605
Orihuela-Espina, F., Leff, D. R., James, D. R., Darzi, A. W., & Yang, G. Z. (2010).
Quality control and assurance in functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)
experimentation. Physics in Medicine and Biology, 55, 3701–3724.

117

Otgaar, H., Wang, J., Franken., & Howe (2018). Believing does not equal remembering:
The effects of social feedback and objective false evidence on belief in
occurrence, belief in accuracy, and recollection. Acta Psychologica, 191, 271-280.
doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2018.10.009
Pfeifer, M. D., Scholkmann, F., & Labruyère, R. (2018). Signal processing in functional
near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS): Methodological differences lead to different
statistical results. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 11(January), 1–12.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2017.00641
Pinti, P., Aichelburg, C., Gilbert, S., Hamilton, A., Hirsch, J., Burgess, P., & Tachtsidis,
I. (2018). A review on the use of wearable Functional Near‐Infrared Spectroscopy
in naturalistic environments. Japanese Psychological Research, 60(4), 347-373.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpr.12206
Pinti, P., Devoto, A., Greenhalgh, I., Tachtsidis, I., Burgess, P., & Hamilton, A. (2020).
The role of anterior prefrontal cortex (area 10) in face-to-face deception measured
with fNIRS. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, nsaa086. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsaa086
Pinti, P., Scholkmann, F., Hamilton, A., Burgess, P., & Tachtsidis, I. (2019). Current
status and issues regarding pre-processing of fNIRS neuroimaging data: An
investigation of diverse signal filtering methods within a General Linear Model
framework. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 12(January), 1–21.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2018.00505
Pinti, P., Tachtsidis, I., Hamilton, A., Hirsch, J., Aichelburg, C., Gilbert, S., & Burgess,
P. W. (2018). The present and future use of functional near-infrared spectroscopy

118

(fNIRS) for cognitive neuroscience. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
1–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.13948
Plichta, M. M., Herrmann, M. J., Baehne, C. G., Ehlis, A.-C., Richter, M. M., Pauli, P., &
Fallgatter, A. J. (2006). Event-related functional near-infrared spectroscopy
(fNIRS): Are the measurements reliable? NeuroImage, 31(1), 116–
124. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.008
Plichta, M. M., Heinzel, S., Ehlis, A.-C., Pauli, P., & Fallgatter, A. J. (2007). Modelbased analysis of rapid event-related functional near-infrared spectroscopy
(NIRS) data: A parametric validation study. NeuroImage, 35(2), 625–
634. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.11.028
Rosenbloom, M. H., Schmahmann, J. D., & Price, B. H. (2012). Neuroanatomy of
Decision-Making. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences,
24(3), 266–277. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.neuropsych.11060139
Rossi, S., Telkemeyer, S., Wartenburger, I., & Obrig, H. (2012). Shedding light on words
and sentences: near-infrared spectroscopy in language research. Brain and
Language, 121(2), 152-163. doi: 10.1016/j.bandl.2011.03.008.
Rubin, D.C. (1988). Autobiographical Memory. New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
Rubin, D. C. (2006). The Basic-Systems Model of Episodic Memory. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 1(4), 277–311. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.17456916.2006.00017.x
Saager, R., and Berger, A. (2008). Measurement of layer-like hemodynamic trends in
scalp and cortex: implications for physiological baseline suppression in functional

119

near-infrared spectroscopy. Journal of Biomedical Optics, 13. doi:
10.1117/1.2940587
Scarapicchia, V., Brown, C., Mayo, C., & Gawryluk, J. R. (2017). Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging and Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy: Insights from
combined recording studies. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 11(419).
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2017.00419
Scholkmann, F., Kleiser, S., Metz, A. J., Zimmermann, R., Mata Pavia, J., Wolf, U., &
Wolf, M. (2014). A review on continuous wave functional near-infrared
spectroscopy and imaging instrumentation and methodology. NeuroImage, 85, 6–
27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.05.004
Schroeter, M.L., Bucheler, M.M., Muller, K., Uludag, K., Obrig, H., Lohmann, G.,
Tittgemeyer, M., Villringer, A., & von Cramon, D.Y. (2004). Towards a standard
analysis for functional near-infrared imaging. Neuroimage, 21, 283–290.
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.09.054
Scoboria, A., & Henkel, L. (2020). Defending or relinquishing belief in occurrence for
remembered events that are challenged: A social-cognitive
model. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3713.
Scoboria, A., Nash, R.A., & Mazzoni, G. (2017). Sub-types of nonbelieved memories
reveal differential outcomes of challenges to memories. Memory, 25(7), 876-889.
doi: 10.1080/09658211.2016.1203437.
Scoboria, A., Mazzoni, G., Kirsch, I., & Relyea, M. (2004). Plausibility and belief in
autobiographical memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 18(7), 791-807.
https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1062

120

Scoboria, A., Jackson, D. L., Talarico, J., & Wysman, L. (2014). The role of belief in
occurrence within autobiographical memory. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 143(3), 1242–1258. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034110.supp
Scoboria, A., & Talarico, J. M. (2013). Indirect cueing elicits distinct types of
autobiographical event representations. Consciousness and Cognition, 22(4),
1495-1509. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.09.007
Scoboria, A., Talarico, J. M., & Pascal, L. (2015). Metamemory appraisals in
autobiographical event recall. Elsevier Cognition, 16(136), 337-349.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.028
Scoville, W.B., & Milner, B. (1957). Loss of recent memory after bilateral hippocampal
lesions. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry. 20(11), 11–21.
https://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp-2015-311092
Sheen, M., Kemp, S., & Rubin, D. (2001). Twins dispute memory ownership: A new
false memory phenomenon. Memory & Cognition, 29(6), 779-788.
Spreng, R. N., & Grady, C. L. (2010). Patterns of brain activity supporting
autobiographical memory, prospection, and theory of mind, and their relationship
to the default mode network. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(6), 1112–
1123. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2009.21282
Summerfield, J. J., Hassabis, D., & Maguire, E. A. (2010). Differential engagement of
brain regions within a “core” network during scene construction.
Neuropsychologia, 48(5), 1501–1509.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.01.022

121

Svoboda, E., McKinnon, M. C., & Levine, B. (2006). The functional neuroanatomy of
autobiographical memory: A meta-analysis. Neuropsychologia, 44(12), 2189–
2208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.05.023
Tak, S., & Ye, J. C. (2014). Statistical analysis of fNIRS data: A comprehensive review.
NeuroImage, 85, 72–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.06.016
Tops, M., & Boksem, M. A. S. (2011). A potential role of the inferior frontal gyrus and
anterior insula in cognitive control, brain rhythms, and event-related potentials.
Frontiers in Psychology, 10. doi: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00330
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In: Tulving E, Donaldson W, editors.
Organization of memory. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of Episodic Memory. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie
Canadienne, 26(1), 1-12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0080017
Van Veen, V., Krug, M.K., Schooler, J.W., Carter, C.S. (2009). Neural activity predicts
attitude change in cognitive dissonance. Nature Neuroscience, 12(11), 1469-1474.
doi: 10.1038/nn.2413.
Vliet, F.F. (1999). Discovery of the near-infrared window into the body and the early
development of near-infrared spectroscopy. doi: 10.1117/1.429952
von Lühmann, A., Li, X., Müller, K. R., Boas, D. A., & Yücel, M. A. (2020a). Improved
physiological noise regression in fNIRS: A multimodal extension of the General
Linear Model using temporally embedded Canonical Correlation Analysis.
NeuroImage, 208, 116472. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.116472

122

von Lühmann, A., Ortega-Martinez, A., Boas, D. A., & Yücel, M. A. (2020b). Using the
general linear model to improve performance in fNIRS single trial analysis
and classification: A Perspective. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience,
14(February), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2020.00030
Wagenaar, W. A., & Crombag, H. F. (2005). The popular policeman and other cases.
Psychological perspectives on legal cases. Amsterdam, NL: Amsterdam
University Press
Wheeler, M.E., Stuss, D.T., & Tulving, E. (1997). Toward a theory of episodic memory:
The frontal lobes and autonoetic consciousness. Psychological Bulletin. 121(3),
331–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.121.3.331
Wright, D. B., & Livingston-Raper, D. (2002). Memory distortion and dissociation:
Exploring the relationship in a non-clinical sample. Journal of Trauma &
Dissociation, 3(3), 97-109, doi: 10.1300/J229v03n03_06
Wright, D.B., & Loftus, E.F. (1998). How misinformation alters memories. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology, 71(2), 155-164.
https://doi.org/10.1006/jecp.1998.2467
Wright, J. C., Huston, A. C., Murphy, K. C., St. Peters, M., Pinon, M., Scantlin, R., &
Kotler, J. (2001). The relations of early television viewing to school readiness and
vocabulary of children from low-income families: The early 54 window project.
Child Development, 72(5), 1347-1366. doi:10.1111/1467-8624.t01-1-00352
Xiao, X., Zhu, H., Liu, W. J., Yu, X. T., Duan, L., Li, Z., & Zhu, C. Z. (2017). Semiautomatic 10/20 identification method for MRI-free probe placement in

123

transcranial brain mapping techniques. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 11(4).
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2017.00004
Ye, J. C., Tak, S., Jang, K. E., Jung, J., & Jang, J. (2009) NIRS -SPM: Statistical
parametric mapping for near-infrared spectroscopy. NeuroImage, 44, 428-447.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.08.036.
Yu, C. L., Chen, H. C., Yang, Z. Y., & Chou, T. L. (2020). Multi-time-point analysis: A
time course analysis with functional near-infrared spectroscopy. Behavior
Research Methods. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-019-01344-9
Yücel, M. A., Selb, J., Aasted, C. M., Lin, P. Y., Borsook, D., Becerra, L., et al. (2016).
Mayer waves reduce the accuracy of estimated hemodynamic response functions
in functional near-infrared spectroscopy. Biomedical Optics Express, 7, 3078–
3088. doi: 10.1364/BOE.7.003078
Yücel, M. A., Selb, J. J., Huppert, T. J., Franceschini, M. A., & Boas, D. A. (2017).
Functional Near Infrared Spectroscopy: Enabling Routine Functional Brain
Imaging. Current Opinions in Biomedicine and Engineering, 4, 78–86.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobme.2017.09.011
Zaragoza, M.S., & Lane, S.M. (1994). Source misattributions and the suggestibility of
eyewitness memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 20(4), 934-945. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.20.4.934
Zhang, Q., Brown, E. N., and Strangman, G. E. (2007). adaptive filtering for global
interference cancellation and real-time recovery of evoked brain activity: a monte
carlo simulation study. Journal of Biomedical Optics, 12. doi: 10.1117/1.2754714

124

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Belief in Occurrence and Belief in Accuracy Rating Items

Belief in Occurrence
1. How likely is it that this scene was presented?
(1 Definitely did not view; 7 Definitely viewed)

2. It is true that this scene was presented.
(1 Not at all true; 7 Completely true)

Belief in Accuracy
3. How confident are you that your memory for this scene is accurate?
(1 Not at all confident; 7 Completely confident)

4. What proportion of your memory for this scene is accurate?
(1 Not at all accurate; 7 100% accurate)
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Appendix B: List of Presented Scenes

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

A girl making a sandwich
A girl washing her hands
A girl painting a picture
A girl styling a doll’s hair
A girl painting someone’s nails
A girl doing a puzzle
A girl placing numbers in a foam board.
A girl doing laundry
A girl mixing liquids
A girl picking a flower
A girl sealing a letter to mail it
A girl writing the numbers 0-10 on a
piece of paper
A girl blowing up a balloon
A girl opening a present
A girl putting on makeup
A girl stretching
A girl brushing her teeth
A girl making a coffee
A girl dressing a doll
A girl eating dinner
A girl making something out of clay
A girl chewing bubble-gum
A girl doing math problems
A girl doing exercises
A girl lighting candles
A girl washing her face
A girl dealing playing cards
A girl colouring in a colouring book
A girl setting the table
A girl fixing a remote control

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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A girl writing in a card
A girl doing a craft
A girl painting Christmas ornaments
A girl cutting a snowflake out of paper
A girl making a paper airplane
A girl sorting coins
A girl flipping through a textbook
A girl putting tape on a bird house
A girl bowling
A girl putting on a rollerblade
A girl brushing and braiding her hair
A girl making a salad
A girl making an ice cream sundae
A girl sealing a letter to mail it
A girl dancing
A girl throwing a toy for her dog
A girl kicking a soccer ball
A girl making a phone call
A girl making her bed
A girl bouncing on a trampoline
A girl making batter for a cake
A girl placing coloured beads on to a
string
A girl drawing on a pumpkin
A girl placing coloured circular stickers
on paper
A girl drawing a rainbow
A girl making a dog do a trick
A girl making tea
A girl doing dishes
A girl doing a cartwheel
A girl hitting a baseball with a bat

Appendix C: List of Scenes that Were Not Presented

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

A girl cutting her nails
A girl organizing her pencil case
A girl playing games on an iPad
A girl brushing a kitten
A girl washing a car
A girl sewing fabric
A girl planting a flower in a garden
A girl making a gingerbread house
A girl flossing her teeth
A girl drawing a family portrait
A girl flying a kite
A girl making a pillow fort
A girl playing the piano
A girl munching on cookies
A girl opening and closing a window
A girl cleaning the bathroom sink
A girl playing a board game
A girl pumping air into the tires of her bike
A girl diving into a swimming pool
A girl stapling paper together
A girl studying for a test
A girl playing bingo
A girl writing her name 3 times
A girl tracing her hand on a piece of paper
A girl printing out pictures from a printer
A girl sharpening a pencil and writing with it
A girl using a calculator to solve a math
problem
28. A girl hammering a nail into a piece of wood
29. A girl washing her windows with a squeegee
30. A girl putting on a sweater
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Appendix D: Participant Pool Advertisement

Title: Remembering Recorded Events
Duration: 2 hours
Bonus points: 3
Description: If you volunteer to participate in this study, we will ask you to come to the
lab and watch or listen to simple scenes (such as “making a sandwich”). One week later,
we will ask you will complete a test of your memory for these scenes while your brain
activity is being recorded using Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS). Both the
first and second session will take 60 minutes to complete, for a total of no more than two
hours of your time. Participants with auditory or visual impairments will not be able to
participate. The second part of the study will take place in a small enclosed lab space, and
we ask participants to provide access to scalp and skin. Participants are unable to wear
light-absorbent makeup, hair coverings, or wigs.
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Appendix E: Post-Study Debriefing
So that was the last question I had for you. Now I’m just going to tell you a little bit more
about the study.
First of all, thank you for participating. This study is examining how people make
decisions about their memories for past events. While we might be tempted to think of
our memories as fixed in our minds, research has shown that memories are continuously
being influenced by new information and experiences that we have. This has led some
researchers to study how people make decisions about memories when they encounter
different types of information.
In this study, we were interested in seeing what people do when feedback is given
that the accuracy or occurrence of their memories are incorrect. In this study there were
two phases. First, you studied many different simple scenes – some you watched and
some you heard.
The second phase, the memory test, occurred today. You may recall that after you
completed the memory test there were a few times that I gave you feedback that your
memory was incorrect. For some of the memory test items, your memory may have been
incorrect – you might have missed key details within scenes, or included details that were
not actually there in your descriptions. You also may have said that a scene was presented
when it was not, or said that a scene was not presented when it was. However, the
feedback I gave you that your memory was incorrect during the second phase (when you
were being recorded with the fNIRS) today was false. We are interested in seeing how
people react to feedback that strong memories are incorrect. In this study, we were
specifically examining how often people reject versus how often they accept the
feedback, and how your brain activity differs dependent on the type of social feedback
you received. The Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy allows us to be able to do just
that, by measuring changes in blood flow in your brain.
So, there was a type of deception in this research. For a small number of scenes
that you correctly identified as being seen, the feedback that I gave you was incorrect.
Those scenes were name scenes given feedback condition 3 or 4. We apologize for the
need for the deception, but there really is no way to study how people respond to
feedback from others without sometimes contradicting accurate memories. With that
being said, it is important to note that this study was not measuring memory accuracy,
nor does susceptibility to social feedback or challenges tell us anything about your
memory ability.
Now that you know about the study, do you consent to the use of your data? Do
you have any questions, or anything else that you would like to tell us about what it was
like for you to participate in this study?
Thank you again for participating. [Arrange compensation; crediting of bonus points].

129

Appendix F: Transcribed Example of Audio Description
“So, there was a woman standing in a kitchen and she had a piece of bread and she was
cutting it with a knife. Um, and then she uh, she had to pull it apart. A-and it wasn’t like
totally even. And then uh, she had some stuff she was putting on it. So, I think there was
meat and cheese, and then she had condiments so there was some ketchup. And, uh that
was it. She made a sandwich.”
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Appendix G: Consent Form

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
Title of Study: Remembering Recorded Events
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Kassandra Korcsog and Dr. Chris Abeare,
Department of Psychology, University of Windsor. If you have any questions or concerns about the research,
please feel to contact Kassandra Korcsog korcsog@uwindsor.ca or Dr. Abeare at cabeare@uwindsor.ca. This
study is being conducted to satisfy the requirements of Kassandra Korcsog’s Master’s thesis.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to examine aspects of memory for recorded scenes, and associated neurology
using Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS), a safe, non-invasive method of recording blood flow in
the brain via infrared light that is shone through the skull and then detected. This is similar to shining a flashlight
through one’s hand.

PROCEDURE
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we will ask you to watch or listen to a series of recorded scenes
(e.g. an actor making a sandwich). One week later, you will complete a memory test. This session will be
audio recorded and your brain activity will be measured using Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS).
The first session will take 60 minutes to complete, and the second session will take 60 minutes, for a total of
no more than 120 minutes (2 hours) of your time. The fNIRS will be used during the second session to record
brain activity while you are being asked questions about your memory for the scenes presented in session
one. The study will take place in a small, enclosed lab setting. You will not be contacted for any follow-up
sessions related to this study.

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
There are no known risks from participating in this study. On rare occasion people may experience mild
emotional discomfort or mental fatigue during some of the tasks, but any negative reactions are expected to
be mild and temporary. You will be wearing a neoprene headband that is used to measure brain activation.
fNIRS is safe to use, however, the device uses class 2/3R lasers which can be harmful to one’s eyes if
mishandled. The researcher has certified training to handle the device and will give you clear, explicit
instructions before the device is switched on. To set up the headband, the researchers will have to touch your
head and hair. You will be asked to sit as still as possible while wearing the headband. Some people may feel
discomfort from the headband or from sitting in one position for an extended period. It is possible that some
people may experience mild and transient anxiety, as the testing takes place in a small room with reduced
lighting. If you feel uncomfortable answering any questions or performing any tasks, you can choose to
discontinue that section of the study without penalty. If you feel the need to talk to anyone about your feelings
or wish to seek assistance, you will be provided a list of resources you can contact in the letter of explanation,
at the end of the study.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
There is no direct benefit to participating in this study. However, the information gained from the overall study
may contribute to research around memory. You can also learn about optical imaging and attention. When
the session is over, the purpose and hypotheses of the study will be described in more detail.

COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
We will provide you with 3 bonus points on completion of the study, if you are enrolled in the Psychology
Participant Pool and an eligible course. 2 points are for completion of the study (Part 1: scene presentation (1
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point) and Part 2: memory test (1 points), separated by one week). An extra 0.5 points will be given after the
commencement of each week, for a total of 3 bonus points.

CONFIDENTIALITY
We guarantee that your participation in this study will be confidential. We will not reveal to anyone else that
you took part in the study without your permission. Any information that can be identified with you will be stored
securely in Dr. Abeare’s laboratory. On the completion of the study, any information identified with you will be
removed from the study record. The audio recording will be stored securely, transcribed, and deleted on the
completion of the study. After the study ends, a record of the bonus points will be kept for one year, at which
time it will be destroyed. All de-identified data will be retained indefinitely.

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
During the duration of your study appointment, you may withdraw without penalty. If you indicate that you
would like to withdraw, we will ask if you are willing to explain why; you are not obligated to tell us your reason
for withdrawing. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant
doing so. You will receive 0.5 bonus points per half hour of time that you have spent in the study up to the
time of withdrawal. Participant data can only be withdrawn up to 10 days after the completion of their study
appointment.

FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS
The results of the study will be posted to the University of Windsor REB website by August 2020
(https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/research-result-summaries/).

SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.

RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research Ethics Coordinator,
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:
ethics@uwindsor.ca

SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the information provided for the study Remembering Recorded Events as described herein. My
questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given
a copy of this form.
______________________________________
Name of Participant

______________________________________
Signature of Participant

___________________
Date

SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR. These are the terms under which I will conduct research.
Signature: _____________________________________
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